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ARTICLES
The Supreme Court and
the New Equity
Samuel L. Bray*
The line between law and equity has largely faded away. Even in
remedies, where the line persists, the conventional scholarly wisdom favors
erasing it. Yet something surprisinghas happened. In a series of cases over the
last decade and a half, the U.S. Supreme Court has acted directly contrary to
this conventional wisdom. These cases range across many areas of substantive
law-from commercial contracts and employee benefits to habeas and
immigration, from patents and copyright to environmental law and national
security. Throughout these disparate areas, the Court has consistently
reinforced the line between legal and equitable remedies, and it has treated
equitable remedies as having distinctive powers and limitations.
This Article describes and begins to evaluate the Court's new equity
cases. Faced with many federal statutes authorizingequitable relief, the Court
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has looked to history and tradition to determine what counts as an equitable
remedy and also to determine the circumstances in which equitable relief should
be given. There have been some blunders, and the Court has taken no account
of the complexity of equity's history. On the whole, however, the Court's new
equity cases represent a reasonable response to an enduring challenge: how to
make sense of equitable doctrines in a world without equitable courts. This
conclusion will prove controversial for scholars in remedies and in various
substantive fields, but even those who disagree will need to grapple with the
new equity cases, for they may shape the law of remedies for decades to come.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The division between law and equity has long been criticized by
legal scholars. Six decades ago, Zechariah Chafee said that it would be
"absurd for us to go on until the year 2000 obliging judges and lawyers
to climb over a barrier which was put up by historical accident in 14th
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century England."' Since then, the number of states with separate
courts of equity has dwindled. 2 In many areas of the law, such as
contracts, the defenses that were available at law and those available
in equity have been assimilated. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
adopted in 1938, took the disparate procedures of law and equity and
transformed them into a unified whole.
In remedies, however, the division persisted. Courts and
scholars continued to refer to some remedies as "legal" and others as
"equitable." Some doctrines appeared to make something turn on that
classification, such as the requirement that a plaintiff seeking equitable
relief must first show there is no adequate remedy at law. But that
requirement, which might be considered the last redoubt of equitable
exceptionalism, was forcefully critiqued over two decades ago as having
no real effect on judicial decisionmaking. 3 And so, a rough consensus
developed among scholars that the division between legal and equitable
remedies was, and should be, disappearing. 4 A reader of law reviews
might have thought that Zechariah Chafee's wish had been granted.
But something remarkable has happened at the U.S. Supreme
Court. Over the last decade and a half, the Court has been slowly,
perhaps even accidentally, laying the foundation for a very different
futurefor the law of remedies. In eleven different cases, from nearly as
many substantive areas, the Court has deeply entrenched the "no
adequate remedy at law" requirement for equitable relief, and it has
repeatedly underscored the distinction between legal and equitable

1.
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Foreword to SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQuITY iii, iv (Edward D. Re
ed., 1955).
2.
One form of division or another, such as separate law and equity courts, divisions,
jurisdictions, or venue rules, still obtains in Delaware, Georgia, Illinois (Cook County), Iowa,
Mississippi, New Jersey, and Tennessee. See infra note 113.
3.

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 3-36, 82-84 (1991).

4.
See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-Merger Justificationof
Unclean Hands, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 455, 509 (2008) ("Distinctions between legal and equitable
defenses are dead. They were buried with the merger. It is time for courts to begin writing their
obituary."); Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53,53-54 (1993)
('The war between law and equity is over. Equity won.... Except where references to equity have
been codified, as in the constitutional guarantees of jury trial, we should consider it wholly
irrelevant whether a remedy, procedure, or doctrine originated at law or in equity."); Doug
Rendleman, The Trial Judge's Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV.
LITIG. 63, 97 (2007) (urging "the profession to discard the nonfunctional terminology of separate
legal and equitable discretion," and calling on judges and legislators to "develop rules, standards,
and precedents around the functional differences between types of decisions and remedies");
Caprice L. Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1027, 1033, 1060 (2011) (endorsing Laycock's call to "complete the assimilation of equity" and
warning of any "unfortunate entanglement with equity's ghosts, especially the irreparable injury
rule").
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remedies.5 The Court has shown no appetite, however, for reviving old
distinctions between legal and equitable courts or procedures. 6 Yet in
remedies, the Court has insisted with vigor on the historic division
between law and equity.
The Court has not given a defense of perpetuating the division
between legal and equitable remedies. Instead, at every point, the Court
has supported its new equity jurisprudence by appealing to history and
tradition. For example, in one of the new equity cases 7-a mere eight
pages in the U.S. Reports-the word tradition or a cognate appears
fourteen times. That is the same number of times traditionappears in
the first song of Fiddleron the Roof.
Despite all these appeals to history and tradition, what the
Court is offering is not something that most historians would recognize,
for it does not reflect the complexity and contingency of equity's past.
And in constructing that history, the Court has sometimes made clear
errors, as when it called mandamus an equitable remedy.8 Yet since
there are many statutes that authorize "equitable remedies" or
"equitable relief,"9 the Court must say what equitable means. The turn
to equity's history should be evaluated in light of the other options the
Court has.
This Article attempts to take the measure of the Court's new
equity cases. It evaluates the Court's use of the history of equity to
shape remedial doctrines. There are places to find fault, for the
5.
The new equity cases are Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014);
US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013); CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866
(2011); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418
(2009); Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674
(2008); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs.,
Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002);
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 312 (1999). The
next in the series is likely to be Montanile v. Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industry
Health Benefit Plan, 593 Fed. App'x 903 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S.
Mar. 30, 2015) (No. 14-723).
6.
See, e.g., Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 n.3 (2013) (recognizing that
equity had a different presumption than law about attorneys' fees, but implying that the
distinction was erased by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
7.
eBay, 547 U.S. 388, 390-94.
8.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 215 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257 (1993)
for the proposition that mandamus is typically equitable); id. at 234 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(same); see John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable"-The Supreme Court's Trail of
Errorin Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1353 (2003).
9.
For examples, see infra note 76. Scholars who criticize the law/equity distinction in
remedies recognize that these statutes pose an obstacle to full merger. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. a (2011); Keith Mason, The Distinctivenessof
Law and Equity in the Taxonomy of the Constructive Trust, in THE RESTATEMENT THIRD:
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT: CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE ESSAYS 185, 194 (Charles

Mitchell & William Swadling eds., 2013).
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execution has been imperfect and the Court has been too critical of the
existence of presumptions about equitable remedies.10 But on the whole,
the Court has constructed an idealized history of equity that is well
suited to judicial decisionmaking. This history is artificial, for it
smooths over centuries of disparate practices in equity. It is therefore
not good as historians' history. But it is good as history for legal
purposes because its very artificiality makes it more suited to the
judicial resolution of cases." This artificial history of equity is also a
sensible interpretation of the many statutes that authorize "equitable
relief." And it is largely consistent with traditional equitable principles.
In the existing scholarship on these cases, however, the central
focus is on the Court's blunders. Scholars in federal courts, remedies,
and related fields have criticized the first two of the new equity cases,
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson 12 and Grupo Mexicano
de Desarrollo, SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.13 In those cases, the Court
divided 5-4 on ideological lines, and critics have faulted the majority's
narrow and passive account of the judicial role.14 Scholars of remedies
have analyzed some of the other new equity cases, especially eBay v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.15 and Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,16 that announced tests for permanent and preliminary
injunctions. These scholars have sharply criticized the Court's
overclaiming about the historical pedigree of the "traditional four-factor
test" it announced in eBay.17 Scholars writing in some of the substantive

10. See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court'sAccidental
Revolution? The Test for PermanentInjunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012).
11. On the Court's artificial history of equity, see infra Part III.B.
12. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
13. 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
14. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations
on Federal JudicialPower-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291 (2000) (criticizing Grupo
Mexicano); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's JudicialPassivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343,
346-51 (criticizing Knudson); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary,
Congress, and FederalPower, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003) (criticizing Grupo Mexicano and Knudson);
David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg'sFirst Decade: Some Thoughts About Her Contributionsin the
Fields of Procedureand Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 22-23 (2004) (criticizing Knudson);
Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1063 (2003) (criticizing
Knudson); see also Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying MonetaryRestitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577,
1616-23 (2002) (finding mistakes about restitution in both the Knudson majority and the primary
dissent).
15. 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
16.
555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008).
17. See Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field:A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 168
(2008) (calling eBay "a spectacular example of the confusion that can result from litigating a
remedies issue without a remedies specialist"); Doug Rendleman, Remedies: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 57 ST. Louis U. L.J. 567, 582 (2013) (calling eBay a "judicial blunder[ ]"); Roberts, supra
note 4, at 1034 (calling eBay "a move backwards").
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domains implicated by the new equity cases have also censured them.18
Most notable in this regard is John Langbein's critique of Knudson and
other cases interpreting the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"). 19 Langbein lacerated the Court for failing to recognize the
trust-law purposes of the statute and for making historical errors about
restitution. 20
Taken together, the scholarly indictment of the Court's cases on
equitable remedies is stinging. But it is also incomplete. The early cases
were marked by false starts, bitter divisions, and technical errors. Since
then, seemingly unnoticed by scholars, the Court has had fewer sharp
divisions about the boundaries and principles of equitable remedies and
about the methodology it uses in these cases. There are fewer mistakes.
In addition, the existing scholarly criticisms tend to rest on one or two
cases in this series. It is hard to adequately assess the Court's work on
equitable remedies without looking across all of these substantive
domains. 21 For example, when looking at only one or two cases, some
scholars lament the constriction of equitable relief.2 2 But when the full
sweep of the Court's equity cases is considered, a more complex picture
emerges: the Court's appeals to tradition sometimes restrict, and
sometimes increase, the available remedies.2 3 This kind of cross-cutting
view, not limited to a single substantive domain, is one for which a
remedies analysis is well-suited-indeed, it is the very reason for
remedies to exist as a field.
What the Court is doing is not new in the sense of a dramatic
break with the immediate past. In many earlier cases, the Court said
that equitable remedies are exceptional and available only where there
18. See Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the JudicialParadoxof "Equitable"Relief Under ERISA
Section 502(a)(3), 39 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 827 (2006); Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy:
Intersectionalityand the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 164 (2009) ("Great-West's
twisted reasoning, going back to the days of equity, causes even seasoned ERISA practitioners to
refer to its holding as 'revolutionary. ").
19. Langbein, supra note 8, at 1355-66.
20. Id.
21.
See Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild DeclaratoryJudgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091,
1123 (2014).
22.
See Resnik, supra note 14. But see Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in
Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 48 (2003) (describing that view as "alarmist").
23. To see this complexity compare (1) Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond
Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999), which categorically restricted a kind of equitable relief; (2) eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006), which took a middle course between the
district and appellate courts as to the availability of equitable relief; (3) Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), which reinforced the discretion of district courts
to deny equitable relief; (4) Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), which read narrowly a
congressional limitation on relief; and (5) Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962
(2014), which insisted that an equitable defense does not limit legal remedies. These cases are
discussed in Parts III and IV.
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is no adequate remedy at law. 2 4 Yet before the new equity cases the
Court seemed unsure of how much force to give the historical
distinctions between legal and equitable remedies. One might have
detected a shift from a more historical approach to a more functional
one, or at least the possibility of such a shift, in the Court's cases on
abstention, 25 contempt, 26 appeals, 27 the Seventh Amendment jury trial
right, 28 and injunctions to enforce federal statutes. 29 It was thus unclear

&

24.
E.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1992); N. Cal. Power
Agency v. Grace Geothermal Corp., 469 U.S. 1306, 1306 (1984) (Rehnquist, Cir. J., in chambers);
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 61 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Mo.Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 532 (1960); Enelow v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 384 (1935);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Ky., 278 U.S. 300, 310 (1929); Mass. State Grange v.
Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 527 (1926); Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 484 (1924); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908); Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.S. 119, 124 (1892); Lewis v.
Cocks, 90 U.S. 466, 469-70 (1874); Watson v. Sutherland, 72 U.S. 74, 79 (1866); Mayor of
Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 98 (1838); Boyce's Ex'rs v. Grundy, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 210, 215 (1830); Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 845-46 (1824);
Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231, 1235 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (Washington, Cir. J.); Hepburn
Dundas's Heirs v. Dunlop & Co., 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 179, 197, 203 n.d (1816); Georgia v. Brailsford,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 417 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.).
25. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (allowing Burford abstention
"only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary"-a position that could
be seen as equitable exceptionalism or as a first step toward a nonhistorical distinction between
remedies that are more discretionary and those that are less discretionary); id. at 734 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("[A]bstention, including dismissal, is a possibility that may yet be addressed in a
suit for damages, if fundamental concerns of federalism require us to face the issue.").
26. See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 844 (1994) (Scalia,
J., concurring):
[T]he modern judicial order is in its relevant essentials not the same device that in
former times could always be enforced by civil contempt. So adjustments will have to
be made. We will have to decide at some point which modern injunctions sufficiently
resemble their historical namesakes to warrant the same extraordinary means of
enforcement.
27.
See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279-88 (1988)
(rejecting the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, which treated certain orders as injunctions, and
excoriating it because "[tihe doctrine, and the distinctions it drew between equitable and legal
actions and defenses, lost all moorings to the actual practice of the federal courts").
28.
See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 574-81
(1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should abandon its effort in Seventh
Amendment cases to find a historical analogy to the cause of action at issue); see also Martin H.
Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III
Proceedings:A Study in Dysfunctional ConstitutionalTheory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 446
(1995) (describing and critiquing functionalism in one aspect of the Court's Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence).

29.
Cf. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-94 (1978) (mentioning traditional
principles about equitable discretion, but adding that "these principles take a court only so far").
But see Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) ("The Court has repeatedly held
that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the
inadequacy of legal remedies.").
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before the new equity cases exactly how committed the Court was to
traditional equity.
The Court's equitable remedies cases are therefore new in two
senses. First, the Court has reinforced what the prevailing view in
remedies scholarship would eliminate: the "no adequate remedy at law"
requirement and the sense that equitable remedies are exceptional.
Second, there are a number of novel but more evolutionary
developments, such as the explicit adoption of a methodology for looking
to history and tradition, and also the prescription of tests (one of which
is novel in form) that emphasize and shape the exercise of judicial
discretion in giving equitable relief. These changes are beginning to be
reflected in the lower courts, and they represent an unpredicted
direction for the law of remedies. 3 0
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II sketches the
conventional view that the distinction between legal and equitable
remedies is and should be fading away. Part III considers the line of
cases in which the Court has defined the boundaries of equity, and it
assesses the Court's turn to history and tradition. Part IV considers the
other line of new equity cases, those in which the Court has prescribed
principles for decisionmaking about equitable remedies. Part V
assesses the new equity cases and the criticisms that have been lodged
against them. It concludes that the historical and doctrinal criticisms
are overdrawn, but it finds more apt the criticism that the Court has
failed to justify its new equity jurisprudence. Part VI concludes.

30. Intriguingly, beginning in the 1990s there was also a greater measure of judicial
resistance to the total fusion of law and equity in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. See
Joshua S. Getzler, Patternsof Fusion, in THE CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 157, 159-63 (Peter
Birks ed., 1997) ("[Tjhe wind now blows the other way, with courts favouring the continued
distinction of legal and equitable doctrine."); see also Andrew Burrows, We Do This at Common
Law but That in Equity, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002) (recognizing a swathe of English
private law "where common law and equity co-exist coherently and where the historical labels of
common law and equity remain the best or, at least, useful terminology"); Mark Leeming, Equity,
the JudicatureActs and Restitution, 5 J. EQUITY 199 (2011) (analyzing the limits of the fusion
achieved by English and Australian legislation, and arguing that those legislative enactments do
not support the construction of an undifferentiated law of restitution). Nevertheless, as Judith
Resnik noted with some understatement when discussing Grupo Mexicano, the Court's
jurisprudence in this area does not indicate a desire "to join in transnational jurisprudential
dialogues." See Resnik, supra note 14, at 246-49.
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II. SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF DISTINGUISHING LEGAL AND
EQUITABLE REMEDIES

For over a century, scholars have been predicting the death of
the division between law and equity.3 1 For nearly as long, scholars have
argued that this death would be a good thing.32 The fate of the division
between law and equity has been especially important in the field of
remedies. In the law school curriculum, it was the disappearance of
equity that made room for remedies to exist as a course. 33 And over the
last few decades, some of the central questions in the field of remedies
have involved the relationship of legal and equitable remedies. 34
One such question concerns the contemporary relevance of the
requirement that plaintiffs, in order to obtain an equitable remedy,
must first show that they have "no adequate remedy at law," sometimes
called the "irreparable injury rule." 35 The adequacy requirement is

old, 36 and it once served at least one clear purpose: when there was only
a single English chancellor, he could avoid being overwhelmed by
refusing to give relief where the law courts could do so adequately.3 7
31. See F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTUREs 20 (John Brunyate ed., 2d ed. 1936)
("The day will come when lawyers will cease to inquire whether a given rule be a rule of equity or
a rule of common law: suffice it that it is a well-established rule . . . ."). For a summary of some of
the academic criticism up to Maitland, see Getzler, supra note 30, at 163-67.
32.
See Chafee, supranote 1, at iv; Walter W. Cook, The Placeof Equity in Our Legal System,
3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 173, 174 (1912); Robert S. Stevens, A Plea for the Extension of Equitable
Principles and Remedies, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 351, 351 (1956).
33. See Laycock, supra note 17.
34.

See OWEN FIss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION

1, 7 (1978)

(arguing against the

"traditional remedial hierarchy," in which an injunction should issue only if "it can be
demonstrated that other remedies are inadequate"); LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 5; Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in PublicLaw Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292 (1976) (concluding
that "the old sense of equitable remedies as 'extraordinary' has faded," and suggesting that they
were becoming the norm); Douglas Laycock, Injunctions and the IrreparableInjury Rule, 57 TEX.
L. REV. 1065, 1065 (1979) (reviewing FISS, supra).
35. For more discussion of the adequacy requirement and the irreparable injury rule, see
infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
36.

See 6 SIR JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1483-1558, at

174 (2003) ("Since the theoretical basis of its jurisdiction was that a party sometimes required a
remedy in conscience where none was available at common law, it was requisite that a plaintiff
show not only a cause of action in conscience but also the absence of a remedy at law."); ADAM
SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 281 (Ronald L. Meek, David D. Raphael & Peter G. Stein

eds., Liberty Fund 1982) (1763) ("But when one wants to have his cause tried by the Court of
Chancery, he relates his story to the court, representing at the same time that the courts of
common law can grant him no redress.").
37. On the chancellor's "presumptive deference to the common law," see JOHN H. LANGBEIN,
RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 287 (2009); and John H. Langbein, Introduction to Book
III, in 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ix (1979). Note that the

adequacy requirement has traditionally not applied to areas that were exclusively equitable, such
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But in a merged system, with many judges, each of whom is able to give
both legal and equitable remedies, that purpose no longer holds. 38 Yet
courts still frequently invoke the adequacy requirement. At present it
has at least one practical consequence, for it requires courts to classify
remedies as equitable or legal-if a plaintiff seeks one of the former, the
court has to look to the adequacy of the latter. 39
Among remedies scholars in the United States, however, there
is a rough consensus that the adequacy requirement is outdated. In its
strong contemporary form, that consensus can be traced to a powerful
book by Douglas Laycock, The Death of the IrreparableInjury Rule.4 0 In
meticulous detail, Laycock argues that even though judges frequently
invoke the "no adequate remedy at law" requirement, it has no actual
effect on their decisions, at least when they are deciding whether to
issue a permanent injunction. 41 When judges want to give a permanent
injunction, they never find legal remedies adequate. 42 Given the
irrelevance of the adequacy requirement, the only effect it could have,
Laycock says, is to confuse the real issue. 43 He therefore argues that it
should be abolished, and his concluding chapter has a restatement that
could be enacted by any legislature or adopted by any court to eliminate
the requirement. 44 In that book and his subsequent work, Laycock
clearly spells out one implication of his argument: we should abandon
as trusts. See Doug Rendleman, IrreparabilityIrreparablyDamaged, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1642, 1643
(1992) (listing "[t]raditionally equitable subjects" and noting by contrast that "[t]he irreparable
injury prerequisite for equitable relief holds sway where legal and equitable jurisdiction is
concurrent and a claimant may receive either a legal or an equitable remedy-for example in
contracts, torts, and copyright").
38.
See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 37, at 287 ("Because fusion has now placed
equity powers in the hands of common law judges, there is less justification for the irreparable
injury rule, and evidence has mounted in recent years that the rule no longer much binds, although
the courts continue to pay it lip service.").
39.
Cf. Murphy, supra note 14, at 1606 ("Although the inadequacy doctrine has little effect
today on the choice between specific relief and damages, the doctrine remains useful when
traditional understandings of the law/equity divide are relevant to the classification of a particular
remedy as legal or equitable.").
40.
LAYCOCK, supra note 3; see also Douglas Laycock, The Death of the IrreparableInjury
Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1990).
41. Preliminary injunctions were a different matter: there Laycock recognizes that the
irreparable injury rule has bite, partly because of a strong policy against giving relief prior to
judgment. See LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 110-17.
42. See LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 5 ("[D]amages are never adequate unless the court wants
them to be.").
43. Id. at 5-7, 279-83.
44. Id. at 265-83; see also id. at viii ("I seek to complete the assimilation of equity, and to
eliminate the last remnant of the conception that equity is subordinate . . . ."). Laycock's
restatement would replace the adequacy requirement with a number of more specific doctrines.
Cf. Samuel L. Bray, On Doctrines That Do Many Things, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 141 (2015) (analyzing
the choice between one multi-function doctrine and several single-function doctrines).
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the distinction between legal and equitable remedies because that
distinction is just a "dysfunctional proxy for a series of functional
choices." 45 It would be better to proceed directly to the underlying
functional questions, asking not whether a certain power or limitation
is traditional in equity, but whether it is needed now.4 6

Laycock's arguments have largely carried the day among
remedies scholars. 47 There are exceptions-one or two scholars have
expressed qualms about the widespread use of contempt,4 8 and a
handful have defended the utility of distinctively equitable defenses
and presumptions. 49 But the view of most remedies scholars in the
United States can be seen in the recent Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. Some restitutionary remedies
originated at law and some in equity. For this reason, the Restatement
has to consider whether a plaintiff, when seeking a kind of restitution
originating in equity, must first show that legal remedies would be
inadequate. The Restatement gives a clear answer: No. 50 Indeed, it says
that to require the plaintiff to make such a showing would be
"antiquated" and "spurious."5 1 Thus the weight of scholarly opinion over

45.
46.
47.

Laycock, supra note 4, at 78.
See id. at 78-80; see also LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 11-16.
See supra note 4.

48.

See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 142 (2d ed.

1993) ("The adequacy test can be discarded, but a pessimistic presumption that disfavors coercion
may prove to be a more difficult matter."); Rendleman, supra note 37, at 1652 ("Laycock's brief
treatment of contempt's dangers does not highlight coercive contempt's risks to individual
liberty .... ). In later work, Rendleman noted that his disagreement with Laycock is exceedingly
narrow. See Doug Rendleman, IrreparabilityResurrected: Does a Recalibrated IrreparableInjury
Rule Threaten the Warren Court's Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343,
1343 n.*al (2002).
49. See Samuel L. Bray, A Little Bit of Laches Goes a Long Way: Notes on Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1 (2014); Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note
10, at 206; Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201 (1990). In
addition, Henry Smith has explored the value of a mode of ex post decisionmaking that is
associated with many doctrines of historical equity. See Henry E. Smith, Property, Equity, and the
Rule of Law, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW (Lisa Austin & Dennis Klimchuck eds., 2015)
[hereinafter Smith, Property, Equity, and the Rule of Law]; Henry E. Smith, Why FiduciaryLaw
Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B.

Miller eds., 2014) [hereinafter Smith, Why FiduciaryLaw Is Equitable].
50.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§

4(2) (2011) ("A

claimant otherwise entitled to a remedy for unjust enrichment, including a remedy originating in
equity, need not demonstrate the inadequacy of available remedies at law."). But see Murphy,
supranote 14, at 1603, 1620 & n.236 (noting some contrary authority).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4(2) cmts. a & e; see
also id. § 4 reporter's note e ("Adequacy of remedies at law. See generally Laycock, The Death of
the Irreparable Injury Rule (1991)."). There is a sliver of ambiguity: the Restatement does require
someone claiming opportunistic breach of contract to show that "the available damage remedy
affords inadequate protection to the promisee's contractual entitlement." Id. § 39(1). Even that
modest reference to inadequacy, avoiding as it does any explicit mention of law and equity, has
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the last few decades has been strongly in favor of eliminating the
adequacy requirement for equitable remedies. More generally, the
trend in American scholarship is to think that the distinction between
legal and equitable remedies is disappearing and should disappear.
III. THE NEw EQUITY CASES AND THE BOUNDARIES OF EQUITY
It is not easy to imagine anything further from the conventional
scholarly wisdom than the Supreme Court's recent cases on equitable
remedies. In these cases, the Court has set about answering two distinct
questions:
1. Is the requested relief equitable?
2. What principles shape the availabilityof equitable relief?
The first question is about the boundaries of equitable remedies. It is a
threshold question, and in analogy to administrative law it could be
called "Equity Step Zero." 52 If the answer to the first question is yes,
then the second question becomes relevant. It is about the content of
the law of equitable remedies. Most of the new equity cases answer one
or the other of these questions, not both.5 3 And the two lines of cases
seem to be developing independently. But in both lines of cases, the
Court is using an approach that is dominated by appeals to the history
and tradition of equity. Although the Justices were sharply divided in

been sharply criticized. See Douglas Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, MICH. L. REV.
929, 947-48 (2012) (calling § 39(1) "unfortunate," as "the rule that equity will not act if there is an
adequate remedy at law has been used and abused for so many disparate purposes over the years
that introducing a limited version of it here will inevitably be a source of confusion and mischief");
Roberts, supra note 4, at 1046-60. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST

ENRICHMENT § 4 reporter's note e (defending reference). In addition, the Restatement recognizes
that the equitable defense of laches "applies only to a suit for equitable relief." Id. § 70 cmt. g. To
assist in the application of laches, the Restatement therefore gives "certain generalizations" about
whether a restitutionary claim is legal or equitable. See id. § 70 cmt. c.
52. The term comes from Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001).
53. The cases about the boundaries of equitable remedies are McCutchen, Amara, Sereboff,
Knudson, and Grupo Mexicano. The cases about equitable principles are Petrella, McCutchen,
Amara, Geertson Seed Farms, Nken, Winter, Munaf, and eBay v. MercExchange. The only cases in
both lists are McCutchen and Amara, though in Petrellathere is also an aside about the boundaries
of equitable remedies. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1967 n.1 (2014).
One could include even more cases. E.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1059 (2015)
(accepting the recommendations of a master regarding equitable remedies in an interstate water
dispute); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (affirming an injunction that required the State
of California to reduce the severe overcrowding in its prisons). But lines must be drawn
somewhere, and the cases that are discussed in this Article are the ones that are central to the
Court's developing equity jurisprudence.
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the first two of the new equity cases, there has been more agreement in
subsequent cases.
This Part considers the Court's cases on the first question, about
the boundaries of equitable remedies. The next Part takes up the
Court's answer to the second question, including the tests it has
prescribed for widely used equitable remedies.
A. The Turn to the History and Tradition of Equity
When a lot of money is at stake, lawyers make creative
arguments. That was certainly the case in Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo, SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.5 4 In the late 1990s, a
Mexican holding company was near insolvency, and it appeared to be
transferring assets to escape the claims of its international
bondholders. Some of those bondholders, investment funds in the
United States, sued in federal court for breach of contract. They sought
more than $80 million in damages, as well as a preliminary injunction
freezing certain unrelated assets that the company might need to
satisfy a money judgment.5 5 The lower courts issued and upheld the
preliminary injunction, which the Mexican holding company then
challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court. Among other points, it argued
that because equity had not historically given asset-freezing injunctions
before judgment, the federal courts had no authority to grant them.56
The historical point about the absence of these injunctions appears to
have been correct." Nevertheless, such injunctions have in the last
several decades become widely accepted in the United Kingdom and
some commonwealth countries and are called "Mareva injunctions" or
"freezing injunctions."5 8 The question for the U.S. Supreme Court in

54.

527 U.S. 308 (1999). For exposition of the case, see Burbank, supranote 14, at 1297-306;

see also DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND

CONTEMPT 597-600 (2010) (discussing the history of the creditor's bill).
55. 527 U.S. at 312.
56. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. 308 (No. 98-231).
57. A possible exception is the injunction at issue in Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. 415 (1793)
and Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. 402 (1792).
58. See Gareth Jones, The Rise of the Mareva Injunction, 11 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 133 (1980);
Paul McGrath, The Freezing Order: A Constantly Evolving Jurisdiction, 31 CIV. JUST. Q., Jan.
2012, at 12. For a range of views on the merits of these asset-freezing injunctions, see R.P.
MEAGHER, W.M.C. GUMMow & J.R.F. LEHANE, EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES §§ 2185-2190,
pp. 605-14 (3d ed. 1992) (censuring them); Burbank, supra note 14, at 1338-45 (raising concerns
about "borrowing wholesale" the U.K. practice); David Capper, The Need for Mareva Injunctions
Reconsidered, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2161 (2005) (endorsing them, while also suggesting that the
facts of Grupo Mexicano did not warrant one); and Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Renewed:
Preliminary Injunctions to Secure Potential Money Judgments, 67 WASH. L. REV. 257 (1992)
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Grupo Mexicano was whether it would allow federal courts to issue
them.
A bitterly divided Court said No. Writing for himself and four
other Justices, Justice Scalia concluded that because these injunctions
were unknown to equity in 1789 and were not analogous to anything
known to equity in 1789, they were beyond the power of federal courts
unless authorized by Congress. 59 He chose this date for statutory
reasons, because the Court was deciding what equitable remedies were
permitted by the Judiciary Act of 1789's authorization of "suits .

.

. in

equity."6 0

He was seeking an equity that seemed almost frozen in time:
the remedies that could have been given, or that were analogous to the
remedies that could have been given, by the chancellor in 1789.61
Justice Ginsburg dissented, with three other Justices, from what
she called the Court's "unjustifiably static conception of equity
jurisdiction." 62 Like the majority, the dissenting Justices looked to the
state of equity at the founding. But instead of searching for "the specific
practices and remedies of the pre-Revolutionary Chancellor," 6 3 the
dissenters looked for "the grand aims" and "principlesof equity existing
at the separation of this country from England." 64 The dissent said that
(arguing for them before Grupo Mexicano); see also RENDLEMAN, supra note 54, at 603 (suggesting
that an asset-freezing injunction may be a poor substitute for the bankruptcy process).
59. 527 U.S. at 318-33.
60. Id. at 326 & n.3. The Court noted that Congress could authorize injunctions not otherwise
known to equity. Id. Although Justice Scalia did not cite the language of Article III, which describes
the judicial power as extending to "cases, in law and equity," the logic of his position that "equity"
in the Judiciary Act of 1789 is substantially limited to equitable remedies available in 1789 could
be extended to the constitutional provision.
61. Justice Scalia grounded this inquiry on the premise that "the equitable powers conferred
by the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not include the power to create remedies previously unknown to
equity jurisprudence." Id. at 332. Note, though, that many of the sources he cited to determine the
remedies that were "traditionally accorded by courts of equity," id. at 319, were actually from the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See infra note 88. Moreover, there are phrases in the opinion
suggesting that the historical inquiry is broader than 1789 and that incremental change is not
ruled out. See id. at 322 ("We do not question the proposition that equity is flexible; but in the
federal system, at least, that flexibility is confined within the broad boundaries of traditional
equitable relief."); id. at 327 (asking whether a remedy has "a basis in the traditional powers of
equity courts"); id. at 329 (referring to the Court's "traditionally cautious approach to equitable
powers, which leaves any substantial expansion of past practice to Congress" (emphasis added)).
In these ways, the majority opinion in Grupo Mexicano anticipated the Court's subsequent cases.
Still, in Grupo Mexicano the Court described itself as powerless to rework the law of equitable
remedies, id. at 332-33, and it advanced a more fixed conception of equity than in later cases. See
id. at 318 (stating that the federal courts substantially possess "the jurisdiction in equity exercised
by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the
enactment of the original Judiciary Act" (quoting ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 660 (1928)).

62.
63.
64.

527 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 342, 336.
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equity was "adaptable," "dynamic," and "flexible." 65 Equity enabled
federal courts, in the absence of congressional direction to the contrary,
"to protect all rights and do justice to all concerned." 66
As important as the question of asset-freezing injunctions is, the
vehemence of the opinions in Grupo Mexicano suggests that the
Justices might really have been debating something else. Perhaps the
majority and dissent were rehashing their disagreement over
constitutional methodology, with Justice Scalia trying to advance, and
Justice Ginsburg trying to resist, a particular kind of originalist
approach to equity. If so, Justice Scalia's sally was misguided. Looking
to the equity of 1789 to determine the equitable remedies available
today would invite a familiar difficulty for originalism: a "pressing need
to find determinate meanings at a fixed historical moment" that can
leave the interpreter unable to "capture everything that was dynamic
and creative." 67 At the same time, this inquiry would lack the textual
elements that are so essential to the practice and justification of
originalism in constitutional law. In 1789, equity had decisions,
principles, even rules. 68 But it had no text: no text that had been made
supreme law through ratification, no text that could be formally
amended, no text that could have its ambiguities "liquidated" through
subsequent practice. 69 Moreover, in 1789 the equity of the nascent
United States was relatively feeble and unsystematic. 70 A striking
example is the recollection by James Kent that in his nine years serving
as chancellor of New York "there was not a single decision, opinion, or
dictum of either of my two predecessors (Ch. Livingston and Ch.

65.

Id. at 336-37, 342 (quoting Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 805,

807 (1869)).

66. Id. at 342 (quoting Providence Rubber Co., 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 807); see Shapiro, supra
note 14, at 22-23 (praising Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Knudson as one of her major contributions
to the law).
67. Jack Rakove, Parchment Barriers and the Politics of Rights, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS:
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND LAW 1791 AND 1991, at 98, 100-01 (Michael J.

Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1992).
68. There is no thorough overview of equity in this period. A brief sketch can be found in
Langbein, supra note 37, at viii-ix. On an earlier period, see D.E.C. Yale, Introduction to LORD
NOTTINGHAM'S 'MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE' AND 'PROLEGOMENA OF CHANCERY AND EQUITY'

7-74 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1965). Holdsworth addresses eighteenth century equity in 12 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 178-330 (1938).

69. There was a text in GrupoMexicano: the Judiciary Act of 1789. But all it did was supply
the word equity. It did not change a fundamentally historical inquiry into a textual one.
70. See Joseph Story, Chancery Jurisdiction, 11 N. AM. REV. 141 (1820), reprinted in THE
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 148, 150-54 (William W. Story ed., Boston, Charles
C. Little & James Brown 1852) (describing American equity before Chancellor Kent, and faulting
it because "the doctrines of the courts depended much less upon the settled analogies of the system,
than upon the character of the particular judge").
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Lansing), from 1777 to 1814, cited to me or even suggested."7 1 For better
or worse, a search for the equity of 1789 will inevitably be a search for
English equity 72-again different from originalism as an approach to
interpreting the Constitution. For these reasons, it is difficult to make
1789 bear the weight of being an originalist year for the enactment of
equitable doctrines.
But the solution is not to turn to the "grand aims of equity"
offered by the dissent. Justice Ginsburg gets the description of equity
right-not just the words but the music. 7 3 Even so, it is not enough to
note the flexibility and adaptability of equitable remedies. Such
principles, standing apart from more specific equitable doctrines and
practices, offer no guidance to lower courts.
Invoking flexibility is also insufficient to interpret equitable in a
statute. Where Congress authorizes "equitable relief' or "equitable
remedies," the phrase expresses a limited authorization. What lies
beyond the authorization cannot be, as Justice Ginsburg's argument
implies," only the remedies that are inappropriate or unjust in a
particular case. Then there would be no limit at all.75 More decisively,
71. MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF CHANCELLOR KENT 157-58 (William Kent ed., Boston, Little
& Brown 1898). Confidence about the role of precedent in early American equity courts is not
possible, however, for no study of the subject exists. The force of English equitable precedent is a
distinct question, but also one that has not been explored. The diversity of views at the founding
can be seen in Post v. Neafie, 3 Cai. 22 (N.Y. 1805), where the court decided that an equitable
decree from an American court could be enforced through an action of debt, even though in England
a decree of Chancery could not be. The majority sounded themes that would later appear in Justice
Ginsburg's Grupo Mexicano dissent. Dissenting in Post, Chief Justice Kent made an argument
that was analogous to Justice Scalia's argument in GrupoMexicano: he appealed to "the history
and peculiar jurisdiction of the court of chancery," concluding that "we are not at liberty at this
day to set aside the rule." Post, 3 Cai. at 36 (Kent, C.J., dissenting).
72. In England, the "hardening" of equity had already happened, and the chancellor had
developed principles and rules for the exercise of his equitable discretion. See J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 106-11 (4th ed. 2002); see also PHILIP HAMBURGER,

LAW AND THE JUDICIAL DUTY 125-26 (2008) (describing the sixteenth-century debate over the
propriety of rules in equity, and its seventeenth-century resolution in favor of such rules); D.P.
Waddilove, Emmanuel College v. Evans (1626) and the History of Mortgages, 73 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
142 (2014) (illustrating the seventeenth-century formalization of equity in miniature through the
redaction of a case report). Of course, the development of equity continued past the end of the
eighteenth century. See Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practiceat the Time
of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 100-06 (1980). And one should not exaggerate
the degree to which equity ever fully resembled law, as even Lord Eldon himself recognized. See
LORD ELDON'S ANECDOTE BOOK 162-63 (Anthony L.J. Lincoln & Robert Lindley McEwen eds.,
1960); see also BAKER, supra, at 110-11.
73. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 335-37
(1999) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 336-38, 342.
75. Accord Great-West Life & Annunity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 216-17 (2002)
(Scalia, J.) (arguing that "there is no way to give" the statutory authorization of equitable remedies
"meaning-indeed, there is no way to render the unmistakable limitation of the statute a
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equitable has long been a technical legal term. It remains routinely used
by Congress in newly passed statutes.7 6 A good reason must be given
before we assume that Congress has suddenly started to use a technical
term in a nonstandard, lay sense. 7 By analogy, if Congress referred to
"fair use" in a new copyright statute, courts would require a good reason
before assuming that Congress was no longer using the phrase as a
technical term. True, Congress could use a phrase such as "equitable
remedy" or "equitable relief" in a sense having nothing to do with
remedies originating in courts of equity, and it occasionally does.78 But

limitation at all-except by adverting to the differences between law and equity to which the
statute refers").
76.
E.g., Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 808, 127
Stat. 54, 116 (2013) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1375a (2012)) (amending regulation of international
marriage brokers to authorize remedies, and expressly indicating that the authorization includes
"equitable remedies"); National Foundation of Fitness, Sports, and Nutrition Establishment Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-332, § 6, 124 Stat. 3576, 3580 (2010) (codified at 36 U.S.C. note preceding § 20101)
(giving the attorney general of the United States the authority, if the named foundation were to
act inconsistent with its stated purposes, to sue "for such equitable relief as may be necessary or
appropriate"); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 744, 124 Stat. 1376, 1735 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1) (authorizing a court to "impose, on
a proper showing . . . , equitable remedies," including certain kinds of restitution); Helping
Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 201, 123 Stat. 1632, 1639 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1639a) (protecting servicers of residential mortgages, if they fall within a statutory
safe harbor, from "any injunction, stay, or other equitable relief'); Veteran's Benefits Improvement
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-389, § 315, 122 Stat. 4145, 4167 (amending 38 U.S.C. § 4323(e) to
require that "[tihe court shall use, in any case in which the court determines it is appropriate, its
full equity powers, including temporary or permanent injunctions, temporary restraining orders,
and contempt orders"); Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120
Stat. 1730, 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125) (authorizing injunctions "[s]ubject to the principles
of equity"); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, §3(a), 119 Stat. 4, 6 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1712) (prescribing rules for the calculation of attorney's fees when a proposed class
action settlement "provides for an award of coupons to class members and also provides for
equitable relief, including injunctive relief"). Federal statutes also use other phrases, such as
"equitable remedies" and "equitable powers."
77.
See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583, 585 (1978) (treating "legal" as a term of art that
should be given its established meaning unless a contrary meaning is compelled); see also MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (2012)
(recognizing that "quiet title" in a federal statute is a technical term); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S.
321, 327 (1796) (Ellsworth, C.J.) (concluding that "Appeal" and "Writ of Error" are terms that "are
to be understood, when used, according to their ordinary acceptation, unless something appears in
the act itself to controul, modify, or change, the fixed and technical sense which they have
previously borne").
78. At least one statute authorizes "equitable relief' yet the phrase does not refer to remedies
at all. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §531(d)(5)(D), 122 Stat.
1651, 2163 (2008) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §1531(d)(5)(D)) (authorizing an administrator to grant
"equitable relief," which in context is essentially a waiver from an eligibility requirement for
disaster relief funds). A number of statutes invoke equity to guide administrative decisions about
various kinds of waivers, and in those statutes, the usual phrase is "equity and good conscience."
E.g., Hubbard Act, Pub. L. No. 110-317, § 2, 122 Stat. 3526, 3527 (2008) (codified at 37 U.S.C. §
303a) (authorizing the Secretary of Defense to waive a limitation on paying military bonuses when
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rarely. In most instances "equitable remedy" and "equitable relief' are
unmistakably technical terms.7 9
In sum, federal statutes that authorize equitable relief are
enabling courts to give a particular set of remedies, not just exhorting
them to give whatever remedies they think best. The question is how to
draw the line between the remedies that are equitable and the ones that
are not. For that question neither Justice Scalia's majority nor Justice
Ginsburg's dissent in Grupo Mexicano is satisfactory.8 0
B. The Constructionof an Artificial History
In subsequent decisions, the Court has not taken either of the
two roads offered in Grupo Mexicano.81 Instead, in a quartet of cases
over the last decade, the Court has set about constructing an idealized
history of equity. These cases-Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson;82 Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.;83 Cigna
Corp. v. Amara;84 and US Airway, Inc. v. McCutchen8 5-have arisen
under ERISA. That statute lays out a framework for how employers can
establish pension and health care plans for employees. Among its
myriad provisions, it authorizes suits to enforce the plan. These may be
brought by the employer or the employee, and the court may issue an
injunction or "other appropriate equitable relief." 86

that limitation "would be against equity and good conscience"). It is usually obvious that those
statutes have nothing to do with judicial remedies.
79. For illustrative statutes, see supra note 76. For further discussion of how equity or
equitable should be interpreted in a statute, see infra text accompanying notes 115-20.
80. Two other important questions are raised by statutory references to "equitable relief' and
"equitable remedies." First, are there any limits on Congress's ability to change the law of equitable
remedies? Second, should federal courts use a presumption in favor of traditional equitable
principles when interpreting statutes? The Supreme Court has not given a consistent answer to
either question, and this Article does not try to resolve them. For brief discussion of the second
question in light of the Court's new equity cases, see infra note 209 and accompanying text.
81. In one of those subsequent cases, Great-West Life Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,
Justice Ginsburg dissented and portrayed the majority opinion as if it were employing Justice
Scalia's approach from Grupo Mexicano, only with a different date at which equitable remedies
were frozen: 1938, the year the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. See 534 U.S. at
224-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Resnik, supra note 14, at 226 (claiming that in Knudson,
as in Grupo Mexicano, the majority limited equitable remedies to those it thought were "available
in equity during the constitutional era"). That was a misunderstanding of the majority's approach.
82. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
83. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
84. 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011).
85. 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013).
86. To be precise, suits under Section 502(a)(3) may be brought "by a participant, beneficiary,
or fiduciary," which will usually be, respectively, the employee, the employee's family, or the
employer. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).
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In these four cases, the Court sought to determine the remedies
"'typically available in equity' in the days of 'the divided bench,' before
law and equity merged." 7 The main sources the Court consulted were
treatises, including ones as recent as Dobbs (1993) and as old as Story
(1836).88 The Court also looked to equitable decisions, typically its own
decisions from the nineteenth century or the early twentieth century.89
And the Court occasionally cited more recent decisions9 0 or scholarly
articles and restatements. 91 But the bulk of the authorities (especially
the authorities that are not current treatises and restatements) came
from the middle and late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It
is a historical investigation that the Court has said is not very
difficult. 92
In the four cases where this approach has commanded a
majority, the opinions for the Court have been written by four different
Justices. One was by Justice Scalia for a narrow majority; 93 another was
87. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. at 1540; Amara, 131 S. Ct. at 1878; Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 356;
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 211.
88. Cited treatises include DOBBS, supra note 48; GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION
(1978); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA (1st ed. 1836); and SPENCER W. SYMONS, POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th

ed. 1941). A sketch of John Norton Pomeroy's thought and influence can be found in DAVID M.
RABBAN, LAW'S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY

32-35 (2013).
89. E.g., McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. at 1546 (citing Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117 (1914), and
Walker v. Brown, 165 U.S. 654 (1897)); Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 357-58 (citing Barnesand Walker as
well). Less common are citations to state courts and English courts. The primary discussion of
English practice appeared in Grupo Mexicano, where Justice Scalia discussed the modern
development of the Mareva injunction. 527 U.S. at 327-29.
90. E.g., McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. at 1551 (citing Blackburn v. Sundstrand Corp., 115 F.3d 493
(7th Cir. 1997)); Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213 (citing Reich v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th
Cir. 1994)).
91. E.g., McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1546, 1549 (citing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2010) and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979)); id. at

1549 (citing John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87
HARv. L. REV. 1597 (1974)); Knudson, 534 U.S. at 212-13 (citing Martin H. Redish, Seventh
Amendment Right to Jury Trial:A Study in the Irrationalityof Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw.
U. L. REV. 486, 528 (1975)).
92. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 217 ("Rarely will there be need for any more 'antiquarian
inquiry' . . . than consulting, as we have done, standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer,
Corbin, and the Restatements, which make the answer clear." (quoting id. at 233-34 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting))).
93. Id. at 206. Knudson was not the Court's first decision on the meaning of "equitable relief'
in ERISA. In two earlier cases, the Court had considered the phrase. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248, 248 (1993) (concluding that beneficiary's claim for monetary relief against plan's
actuary was not "equitable relief'); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 134 (1985)
(concluding that ERISA did not impose extra-contractual liability on fiduciaries for claimprocessing mistakes). And there is a line of cases interpreting historically the Seventh
Amendment's guarantee that "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." E.g., Chauffeurs,
Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990). In hindsight, those earlier
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by Chief Justice Roberts for a unanimous Court; 94 the third was by
Justice Breyer for a large majority;9 5 and the most recent was by Justice
Kagan for a Court that was, on this point, unanimous. 96 This approach
has become sufficiently settled that Justice Kagan could call it "the
historical analysis our prior cases prescribe." 97
The Justices may agree, but by the standards of historians this
is a fool's errand. Equity has a long history, 98 and in that history many
conflicting things have been said about it. It was once said, for example,
that equity would never enjoin a trespass.9 9 Now it is widely (though
inaccurately) thought that the very meaning of having a property right
is that a court will enjoin a trespass. 100 Justice Holmes once said that
equity does not offer "a remedy for political wrongs."10 1 Then came

&

ERISA cases and Seventh Amendment cases might seem to be harbingers of the new equity, but
they did not appear that way to scholars at the time. Rather, as Douglas Laycock said shortly
afterwards about the Court's interpretation of "equitable relief' in Mertens, "what is most striking
is the [Court's] express assumption that Congress used a technical term inaccurately because
lawyers no longer know what it means." Laycock, supra note 4, at 81-82. On the ambiguity of the
Court's commitment to traditional equity before the new equity cases, see supra notes 25-29 and
accompanying text.
94. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 358.
95. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1870 (2011).
96. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. at 1542.
97. Id. at 1548.
98. For introductions to the history of equity, see generally BAKER, supra note 72, at 97-116;
LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supranote 37, at 267-412. On equity in colonial America, see Stanley
N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversiesover Chancery Courts and Equity
Law in the Eighteenth Century, in 5 LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 257-84 (Donald Fleming
Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971); HAMBURGER, supra note 72, at 338-42.
99. A case from 1743, Coulson v. White, 3 Atk. 21, has been called "[tihe earliest suggestion
of an injunction against trespass." 1 JAMES BAR AMES, A SELECTION OF CASES IN EQUITY
JURISDICTION WITH NOTES AND CITATIONS 487 n. 1 (1904). Even when an injunction would issue

against a trespass, it was far from automatic. See Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 333 (N.Y. Ch.
1823) (Kent, Ch.):
I do not know a case in which an injunction has been granted to restrain a trespasser,
merely because he was a trespasser, without showing that the property itself was of
peculiar value, and could not well admit of due recompense, and would be destroyed by
repeated acts of trespass.
cf. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 132, at 48 (offering the need for testimony and the lack of crossexamination in equity's procedure as "the probable explanation for the hesitation of equity to
enjoin trespasses to land"). Note that the early modern meaning of trespass was broader than it is
today, including large swathes of what is now tort law.
100. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property,
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 638-39 (2008) (noting

that "it remains common in modern times to equate the right to exclude with an entitlement to
exclusionary or injunctive relief' and recognizing that such an equation disregards the fact that
the injunction is an equitable remedy).
101. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1902).
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Baker v. Carr102 and Bush v. Gore.10 3 This sic et non could be carried on
at length. The reason is not that equity is incoherent. Rather, it is that
equity is an old and complex juridical tradition, and in such a tradition
"the past speaks with many voices." 104 But in the Court's approach,
there is little if any recognition of historical change. With no
embarrassment, the Court can declare what "equity originally required"
and then give as support not a reference to a proceeding in the medieval
Chancery, but a citation to an American case from

18 7 5

.t05

There is also difficulty with the phrase "the days of the divided
bench." That phrase has now been intoned by three Justices,1 0 6 and it
is supposed to be the quarry the Justices are pursuing across the
centuries. Yet it is not clear what the phrase actually means. England
has not had separate courts of law and equity since the 1870s.10 7 Does
that mean that subsequent English cases are not from the days of the
divided bench? Or think of the federal courts, which once had separate
law and equity "sides," each with its own procedures.1 08 That separation
ended with the coming of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938.109 But for equitable remedies, 1938 is not even a noteworthy year,
for the Rules were understood as not changing the requirements for

102. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
103. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
104. Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 L. & PHIL. 237, 242 (1986). Daniel Hulsebosch has
made a point about English liberty that could be applied with similar force to equity: "History lies
in details rather than in summary propositions, and the details cut in many directions because
there were so many people in so many places who made claims under the banner of 'the liberties
of Englishmen.' " Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Somerset's Case at the Bar: Securing the "PureAir" of
English JurisdictionWithin the British Empire, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 699, 700 (2007).
105. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356, 366 (2006) (citing Trist v. Child, 88
U.S. 441 (1875)). There is a particular irony in citing a case from 1875 for what "equity originally
required," for that was the year the English Chancery was dissolved as an independent judicial
institution. Patrick Polden, Partal: The Courts of Law, in 11 THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND, 1820-1914, at 523, 757-73 (2010).
106. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1544 (2013) (Kagan, J.); Sereboff, 547
U.S. at 362 (Roberts, C.J.); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212
(2002) (Scalia, J.); see CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1878 (2011) (Breyer, J.) (seeking to
determine the remedies that "traditionally speaking (i.e., prior to the merger of law and equity)"
were typically equitable (internal quotation marks omitted)). The phrase appears to have been
used with reference to law and equity for the first time by Justice Scalia in Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
107. The relevant legislation is the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. Polden, supra note 105,
at 757-73. It is possible that "the days of the divided bench" is an allusion to Maitland's definition
of equity, which laid stress on the fact that separate courts of equity no longer existed. See
MAITLAND, supranote 31, at 1.
108. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
109. Id.
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equitable relief. 1 0 Nor is the founding the moment to look to, for most
of the original states did not even have regularly sitting courts of
equity."1 ' Some of them later developed such courts, but by 1868 a
majority of the states had unified courts of law and equity. 112 IS that
when the "days of the divided bench" ended? Or did those days linger in
the states that kept separate law and equity courts? Even today several
states have not merged their courts of law and equity.1 13 Does that
mean that they are still living in the "days of the divided bench" and
that their evolving equitable doctrines are a continual source of insights
into what equity means?
In short, there is no sharp-edged historical referent for the
expression "the days of the divided bench." What the Court is
constructing might be called an artificial history of equity. 1 4 It allows
110. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1974 (2014) (recognizing that
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made no change in "substantive and remedial
principles" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368,
383 n.26 (1949) ("Notwithstanding the fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the substantive principles of Courts of Chancery remain unaffected."); Bradley v. United States,
214 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1954) ("The federal rules of civil procedure abolished all distinctions as to
form between actions at law and suits in equity, but they did not abolish the difference in substance
between legal and equitable remedies."); Bray, supra note 49, at 3-4 (describing the general rule
that laches applies only to equitable claims, even after the adoption of the Federal Rules); see also
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 519 (1959) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Certainly
the Federal Rules were not intended to undermine the basic structure of equity jurisprudence,
developed over the centuries and explicitly recognized in the United States Constitution.").
111. Morris S. Arnold, A HistoricalInquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil
Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 832 (1980).
112. By the end of that year, nineteen of the thirty-seven states had either never created
separate courts of equity or had abolished them. Massachusetts and Louisiana never had separate
courts of equity. The seventeen that had merged their courts were Pennsylvania (1736); Texas
(1840); New York (1848); Missouri (1849); Michigan (1850); California and Iowa (1851); Indiana
(1852); Minnesota and Ohio (1853); Nevada (1861); and North Carolina, North Dakota, and South
Carolina (1868). There is no general history of merger in the United States, though there are
historical sketches about the law and equity courts in particular states. E.g., Morton Gitelman,
The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery Courts:HistoricalAnomalies and
PoliticalRealities, 17 U. ARK. LITILE ROCK L.J. 215, 235-244 (1995).
113. Delaware, Mississippi, and Tennessee retain at least some separate courts for equity.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (2015); MISS. CONST. art. VI, §§ 152-154, 159-164; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 16-11-101 (2014). New Jersey and Cook County, Illinois, have separate divisions for law and
equity within a single court. ILCS S. CT. R. 135; 1B N.J. PRAC. CT. R. ANN. R 4:3-1(a) (2015 Supp.).
Georgia distinguishes equity for trial and appellate jurisdiction. GA. CONST. art. VI, §4, 1I; id. art.
VI, §6, T III. Iowa has unified courts that administer what the state constitution calls "distinct and
separate jurisdictions" for law and equity. IOWA CONST. art. V, § 6.
114. The more famous instance of law taking something richly diffuse and compressing it for
adjudication is, of course, Lord Coke's "artificial reason of the law." See EDWARD COKE,
PROHIBITIONS DEL ROY (1607), reprinted in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR

EDWARD COKE 478, 481 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (recounting his statement to the king that
"causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his Subjects; they are not to
be decided by naturall reason but by the artificiall reason and judgment of Law"); EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, reprintedin 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
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the Court to proclaim what was done "in equity"-without reference to
any particular court, nation, or century. It is true that the Court has
not created this equitable tradition ex nihilo (as is sometimes true of
traditions). Yet this tradition is still an abstraction from history. It
glosses, and glosses over, the real complexity of equity's past.
The failings of this history are not the full story. In the scores of
federal statutes authorizing "equitable relief,"11

the phrase must be

interpreted. Justice Scalia's nearly static approach has no persuasive
principle; Justice Ginsburg's alternative, no limiting one. In contrast,
the artificial-history approach is a plausible interpretation of these
statutes. There is no reason to imagine Congress wanting something
fixed more than two centuries ago,116 or something so indeterminate
and up for grabs that any judge could rewrite the remedial structure of
the statute.11 7 Some definition is needed. Moreover, one would expect
the recurring references to "equitable relief' in the U.S. Code to have
something in common. References to "equitable relief' or "equitable
remedies" seem like a shorthand for something accepted and
conventional, something understood. In this they resemble other
common statutory terms that have a legal meaning that is conventional
and stable, yet not absolutely fixed at the time of enactment, such as
oath, insane, and county. 118 If statutory references to "equitable relief'
and "equitable remedies" were not understood this way, if every
occurrence of these phrases were to be given independent meaning,
there would be many investigations that would each culminate in a
different answer about the remedies available.1 19 Any sense that all of
these Congresses were trying to refer in shorthand to something
generally understood would be lost, drowned in a wave of dubiously
exact historiography. 1 20 By contrast, an artificial history offers some

SIR EDWARD COKE 573, 701 (describing the common law as "an artificiall perfection of reason,
gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every mans naturall reason, for,
Nemo nasciturartifex [No one is born an artificer]").
115. See supra note 76
116. See Great-West Life Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 225 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
117. Of. id. at 220-21 (majority opinion, Scalia, J.) (noting that § 502(a)(3) of ERISA limits
suits brought by a fiduciary to "equitable relief' but imposes no such limitation on suits by a plan
participant or beneficiary).
118. These three words are all defined in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8.
119. There is a hint that the Court might have been willing to go down that path in one of the
antecedents to Knudson. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs, 508 U.S. 248, 257 n.7 (1993) (Scalia, J.)
(referring to the remedies available "when ERISA was enacted").
120. In addition, the Court's turn to history and tradition preserves the logic of equitable
remedies, defenses, and enforcement mechanisms. See Bray, supra note 49, at 4-5; Samuel L.
Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 U.C.L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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parsimony and stability. The meaning of "equitable relief' does not
fluctuate with the enacting year of every statute.121
Admittedly, the artificial-history approach is not good history.
But that does not keep it from being good jurisprudence. The
disjuncture between the standards of history and of law-and especially
the disjuncture between history in historical scholarship and history in
legal adjudication-is familiar. Elsewhere (i.e., outside of equity) it has
been recognized by scholars such as Richard Bernstein, Robert Gordon,
J. C. Holt, Laura Kalman, Martin Krygier, William Nelson, John Philip
Reid, and Mark Tushnet.1 22 Indeed, the disjuncture between what the
historian and the lawyer seek from the past has been recognized at least
since Frederic Maitland, who said that "what is really required of the
practising lawyer is not, save in the rarest cases, a knowledge of
medieval law as it was in the middle ages, but rather a knowledge of
medieval law as interpreted by modern courts to suit modern facts."1 2 3

121. In Knudson, Justice Scalia criticized the uncertainty that would come from a "rolling
revision" of the meaning of equitable relief by judges. 534 U.S. at 217. Yet similar uncertainty
would be present if judges were to give each reference to "equitable relief' a different meaning
based on the year the statute was enacted.
122. See J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 4 (2d ed. 1992) ("Coke was seeking the continuous thread
in English law.. ., [the] principles and judicial decisions which in his view indissolubly linked his
world with the past. The modern historian seeks the opposite."); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 167-229 (1996) (exploring the "dialogue of the deaf' between
historians and lawyers, specifically in the republicanism bubble in legal scholarship in the 1980s,
and describing the costs of trying to eradicate the differences between history and law); JOHN
PHILIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LIBERTY 3 (2005)

(treating the appeals of English and American lawyers to the "ancient constitution" as an example
of "forensic history," a "subdivision of history" that is fundamentally different in aims and methods
from the history of historians); Richard B. Bernstein, Chartingthe Bicentennial, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1565, 1578 (1987) (distinguishing " 'lawyers' legal history,' written to generate data and
interpretations that are of use in resolving modern legal controversies, and 'historians' legal
history,' written to provide and support new and interesting interpretations and bodies of data to
advance exploration of the past" (quoting and summarizing W. NELSON & J. REID, THE LITERATURE
OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, 185, 235-37, 261-87 (1985))); Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in
Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1055 (1981):
Many of the criticisms that historians make of lawyers' history are indeed irrelevant to
the lawyer's task. At least the immediate interest of historians is always in
"historicizing" the past as much as possible, tamping it down firmly in departed times
and places. For lawyers, this method is useful only half the time ....
Krygier, supra note 104, at 249 ("Whig interpretations may be unsuccessful history, but they are
often very successful law."); Mark Tushnet, InterdisciplinaryLegal Scholarship: The Case of
History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 934-35 (1996) ("Law-office history is a legal practice,
not a historical one. The criteria for evaluating it, for determining what is a successful
performance, must be drawn from legal practice rather than from historical practice.").
123. Frederic William Maitland, Why the History of English Law Is Not Written, Inaugural
Lecture at the Arts School at Cambridge (Oct 13, 1888), reprinted in 1 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 480, 490 (1911). The point that the law of historians and lawyers is
different was made as early as the seventeenth century. See ROGER TWYSDEN, CERTAINE
CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND 23 (John Mitchell Kemble ed., 1849):
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It is a commonplace of the legal culture of the United States that
judges and lawyers will look to the past, for the past is where the
Constitution was ratified, statutes were passed, precedents were
established, practice grew up, consequences happened. Historians, too,
look to the past. They give free rein to all of its unruly contingency and
indeterminacy; they do not have to decide cases. But for judges the
imperative to decide the case is central to the use of history.1 24 Judges
are looking to history, but not for historical purposes. 125 They must force
unruly historical events through a decisionmaking process that will
have binary results, such as liability or no liability, damages or no
damages, guilt or acquittal, jury trial or no jury trial, the availability of
laches or no availability of laches, contempt or no contempt.126 Judges
have no leisure for prolonged investigation, a series of monographs, a
revise-and-resubmit. They do have some grounds for abstaining from
making a decision, but there is no such thing as Incomplete Historical
Record Abstention. Pressed to use history, and pressed to decide, judges
tend to emphasize the continuity of the past and the present. 127 This is
another way their use of history differs sharply from historical
scholarship, which tends to emphasize discontinuity. 128

The truth is, the law delivered by an historian is much differing from that comes from
a lawyer, as declaring not only the fact, but the policy, reason, and matter of state in it,
where the other resolves onely how it stood with the law, and upon what poynt in that
it was adjudged; it is not to bee denyed they have much conformity in things, yet in
some they differ.
124. See Helen Irving, Constitutional Interpretation, the High Court, and the Discipline of
History, 41 FED. L. REV. 95, 99 (2013).

125. A comment in the Restatement (Third) aptly expresses this point, though in words that
the reporter might actually have intended to be a criticism:
As posed today in American courts, the question whether restitution is legal or
equitable is essentially artificial. It has a historical answer . . . but if it were not for
extraneous, nonhistorical concerns, the question would scarcely be asked. Lawyers and
judges who address the question are invariably trying to answer a different one:
whether there is a right to jury trial of a particular issue, or whether a particular
remedy is available under a statute that authorizes "equitable relief."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§4

cmt. c (2011).

126. There are of course judicial questions that scale-how much should damages be, what
should be the scope of the injunction-but the antecedent question is often a binary one.
127. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal
History, 17 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 275, 275-76 (1973) (finding continuity to be a theme in "lawyer's
legal history"). This emphasis on continuity reflects the affinity between judicial appeals to history
and judicial appeals to custom. See John Philip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. LA L. REV. 193,
222 (1993).

128. The attitude toward the past in normative legal scholarship often aligns more with that
of historians than with that of lawyers. See Stuart Banner, Legal History and Legal Scholarship,
76 WASH. U. L.Q. 37 (1998) (critically examining the incentives for normative legal scholarship to
emphasize discontinuity with the past, and noting the contingency of this emphasis on
contingency).
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It should not then come as a surprise that the Court is
constructing an artificial history of equity. Although the Justices range
over the whole history of equity, they tend to draw from the equity of
the middle-to-late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.
They do not explicitly recognize, much less justify, that tendency. Yet it
is not random. The Court is gathering its equitable rules from when
those rules were most systematically expounded. 129 In the United
States, the era of the most systematic treatments of equity began with
the first edition of Story's treatise (1836)130 and effectively ended with
the last edition of Pomeroy's equity treatise (1941)131 and the last
edition of McClintock's equity handbook (1948).132 Between those
bookends can be found most of the American treatise writing on
equity.1 33 As it chooses, however, the Court will sometimes work into its
artificial history more recent cases and scholarship. 134
The effect is something like a tailor who is working with a large
bolt of fabric, full of rips and tears, who knows the fabric is too big, and
so decides to lop off a large ragged section at the beginning, and cuts off
129. The Court has cited no equity cases from the early centuries of Chancery, and this is not
surprising given the sparseness of the printed reports and the difficulty of the historical
investigation. See H. Tombs G6mez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright
Injunctions and the Inadequate Remedy-at-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1222-25
(2008); Waddilove, supra note 72, at 147-48. For a sketch of the Chancery reports, see LANGBEIN,
LERNER & SMITH, supra note 37, at 352-53. For a recent investigation of manuscript sources, see
H. Tomas G6mez-Arostegui, Equitable Infringement Remedies Before 1800, in THE HISTORY OF
COPYRIGHT LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Isabella Alexander & H. TomAs

G6mez-Arostegui eds., forthcoming 2015).
130.

STORY, supra note 88.

131. SYMONS, supra note 88.
132.

HENRY L. McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (2d ed. 1948). That

end date does not appear to have been driven by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938. In the preface to the second edition, subscribed "April, 1948," McClintock said:
The twelve years that have passed since the publication of the first edition of this
hornbook have not witnessed any great changes in the doctrines of equity or in their
application. The process of the fusion of the law and equity has been advanced by the
adoption by the United States Supreme Court of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and a similar change is in progress in New Jersey, but these changes have as yet
produced few significant changes in equity.
Id. at v.
133. There are notable exceptions, and subsequent systematic work that encompasses
equitable remedies includes DOBBS, supra note 48; LAYCOCK, supra note 3; and PALMER, supra
note 88. For a bibliographic sketch of American equity treatises, see Laycock, supra note 17, at
171-73. Lionel Smith has noted that in other areas, the treatise writers tried to systematize and
reform the common law with an eye toward the civil law, but in the civil law countries there was
no distinction between law and equity. Accordingly, Smith says, "for many decades, the textbooks
on Equity did not aspire to lead, but only to follow," and they "did not systematize, except where
the judges did." Lionel Smith, Common Law and Equity in R3RUE, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.1185,
1191 (2011).
134. With the artificial history of the law, as with the artificial reason of the law, the need for
interpretive choices is inescapable.
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a piece from the end, and then trims away the rough edges in the
middle, and finally takes this much-reduced cloth and patches up its
holes with bits of cuttings from the floor. The tailor has a new old fabric.
It is different from the original bolt of cloth, for it is smaller, tidier, and
better adapted to the task at hand.
Nevertheless, even though the Court's approach is sound in
terms of statutory interpretation and plausible as an artificial history,
it still risks making equitable remedies hopelessly out of date, just as
much as if they were fixed in 1789. Here the very artificiality of the
Court's ideal history could be useful. 135 It enables a modest updating,
not absolutely precluding consideration of more recent work in the
equitable tradition by courts and commentators. As long as incremental
updating is not excluded, the Court's approach can have the measure of
stability and the capacity for change that are characteristic of a
tradition. 136
IV. THE NEW EQUITY CASES AND EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES

The other line of cases in the Court's new equity jurisprudence
speaks to when equitable remedies should be given. These cases
announce principles, and sometimes multipart tests, for the
decisionmaking of federal courts. As in the boundary-of-equity cases,
the Court has self-consciously looked to the history and tradition of
equity.

137

A. The New TraditionalTest for Permanent Injunctions
The Court's most important decision in decades on the standards
for a permanent injunction is eBay v. MercExchange.138 What makes the
influence of the eBay decision surprising is how accidental it appears to
have been. At issue in the case was whether a certain kind of
patentholder-one who does not participate in the relevant marketwould get a permanent injunction against infringing products more or

135. Cf. T. S. ELIOT, LITTLE GIDDING ("History may be servitude, / History may be freedom.").
136. See EDWARD SHILS, TRADITION (1981) (analyzing stability and change in traditions);
Krygier, supra note 104, at 251 ("[T]he very traditionality of law ensures that it must change.");
see also W.M.C. GUMMOW, CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: STATUTE, EQUITY, AND FEDERALISM 48
(1999) ('The doctrines and remedies of equity are not 'frozen in time.' "). One might compare
Justice Souter's historically minded, but not absolutely fixed, position on the claims allowed by the
Alien Tort Statute. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-38 (2004).
137. The Court has not, however, shown the same explicit attention to methodology in these
cases as it has in the boundary-of-equity cases.
138. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Preliminary injunctions are governed by a different test, which is
discussed below. See infra Part IV.B.
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less automatically. 1 39 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas framed the
question in terms of whether traditional equitable principles applied to
patent cases. 140 The Court's answer was unanimous: the "traditional
test" for permanent injunctions applies to "disputes arising under the
Patent Act." 141
In resolving this question, the Court instructed lower courts to
apply "well-established principles of equity." 142 According to those
principles, the Court said, "a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction
must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief,"
showing:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.143

The Court modestly described its holding in eBay as "only that the
decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the
equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must
be exercised consistent with traditional principles in equity, in patent
disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards." 144
Nevertheless, the formulation of the injunction standard in eBay has
had extensive reach. 145 As is common with decisions in remedies and
procedure, it has transcended the substantive context in which it
arose. 146 It has become the leading federal authority on the
requirements for a permanent injunction.147

139. On remedies for patent infringement, see generally THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE
PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2013); Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup

and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
535 (2008); Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegrationof Intellectual Property?A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2010); John M. Golden, Principles for
Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505 (2010); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007).
140. 547 U.S. at 391-92, 394.
141. Id. at 390. The concurrences by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy matter
intensely for patent law, because they represent markedly different degrees of willingness to grant
injunctive relief to patentholders not participating in the market. But here it is the similarity
between the concurring opinions that is more relevant, for both invoke the history and tradition of
equity.
142. Id. at 391.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
145. See Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 10.
146. Bray, supra note 21, at 1145.
147. Westlaw records that as of April 1, 2015, eBay has been cited in 1,747 federal court
opinions but only fourteen state court opinions.
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But why has eBay had so much influence in the lower federal
courts if it was merely applying "the traditional four-factor test"? 148
Therein lies a puzzle. Before eBay, "[rlemedies specialists had never
heard of the four-point test." 14 9 There was a widely used four-part test
5 0 Some federal courts had employed
for preliminary injunctions.o
multipart tests for permanent injunctions, but the tests varied
considerably.15 1 And federal courts had often granted or denied
injunctions without reference to any test. As Douglas Laycock put it,
"There was no such test before, but there is now."1 52
Still, as other scholars have noted, each part of the Court's test
has deep roots in the history of equity.1 53 Moreover, a nearly identical
test for permanent injunctions had been used by the Kansas Supreme
Court,15 4 and a similar one had been used by courts in Tennessee. 5 5

Each part of the eBay test can be found in injunction tests that had been
used in some lower federal courts. In a plurality of the circuits-the
148. 547 U.S. at 393.
149. Rendleman, supra note 4, at 76 n.71; see also Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 10, at
205 ("Remedies scholars have said that, before eBay, they were unfamiliar with any traditional
four-factor test for permanent injunctions."); Roberts, supra note 4, at 1037 ("It was news to
remedies and injunctions scholars that the four-factor test was the required 'traditional,'
'ordinarily' applied, familiar test .... .").
150.

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 426 (4th ed.

&

2010); Rendleman, supranote 4, at 76 n.71.
151. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
152. LAYCOCK, supranote 150, at 427.
153. See Rachel M. Janutis, The Supreme Court's Unremarkable Decision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 597, 618-624 (2010); see also Gergen, Golden
Smith, supra note 10, at 207 ("The eBay test does feature factors that courts have traditionally
considered in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief.").
154. See Nat'l Compressed Steel Corp. v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Cnty./Kan. City, 38 P.3d
723, 729 (Kan. 2002):
To obtain injunctive relief, [National] must show: (1) there is a reasonable probability
of irreparable future injury to National; (2) an action at law will not provide an adequate
remedy; (3) the threatened injury to National outweighs whatever damage the proposed
injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued, would not be
adverse to the public interest.
Intriguingly, the Kansas test seems to have been taken from a test for preliminary injunctions.
Compare Sampel v. Balbernie, 889 P.2d 804, 807 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (permanent injunction),
with Wichita Wire, Inc. v. Lenox, 726 P.2d 287, 290-93 (Kan. Ct. App 1986) (preliminary
injunction). Several scholars have suggested a similar migration for the eBay test. See supra note
150 and accompanying text.
155. See Vintage Health Res., Inc. v. Guiangan, 309 S.W.3d 448, 467 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)
("When determining whether to grant injunctive relief, the trial court should consider such factors
as the adequacy of other remedies, the danger that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm
without the injunction, the benefit to the plaintiff, the harm to the defendant, and the public
interest."); Zion Hill Baptist Church v. Taylor, No. M2002-03105-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 239760,
at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2004) ("When a trial court decides to grant an injunction, several
factors are to be considered such as the danger of irreparable harm, the inadequacy of other
remedies, the benefit to the plaintiff, the harm to the defendant, and the public interest.").
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First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, D.C., and Federal Circuits-courts had
sometimes used a four-part test consisting of success on the merits,
irreparable injury, balance of harms, and the public interest.15 6 The
Sixth Circuit had used a different four-part test: success on the merits,
irreparable injury, no adequate remedy at law, and the public good.1 57
The Fourth Circuit had applied a three-part test: no adequate remedy,
balance of equities, and the public interest. 15 8 The Eighth Circuit had
applied its own three-part test: irreparable harm, balance of equities,
and the public interest. 159 None of the federal tests just mentioned
included all four parts of what would be the eBay test, but each did
include three parts of that test, though with variation in wording.
What was so bracing to remedies scholars was the Court's
treatment of the first two parts of the test: (1) the irreparable injury
rule and (2) the requirement of no adequate remedy at law. 160
Traditionally, these have served to maintain the line between legal and
equitable remedies. They create the remedial hierarchy between legal
and equitable remedies; they foster the impression that the injunction
is an exceptional remedy. And most scholars,1 61 though not all
156. See Collins v. Hamilton, 349 F.3d 371, 374 (7th Cir. 2003); Fisher v. Okla. Health Care
Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2003); Aponte v. Calderon, 284 F.3d 184, 191 (1st Cir. 2003);
Nichols v. Truscott, 424 F. Supp. 2d 124, 143 (D.D.C. 2006); Doe v. KPMG, L.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d
746, 751 (N.D. Tex 2004).
157. See Tesmer v. Granholm, 333 F.3d 683, 702 (6th Cir. 2003). In addition, a district court
opinion worked through the eBay factors in order but without enumerating them as a test. AeroMotive Co. v. U.S. Aeromotive, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 29, 46-47 (W.D. Mich. 1996):
[P]laintiff has proven that it has suffered an irreparable injury and is without an
adequate legal remedy. Further, the risk of harm to plaintiff is outweighed by the risk
of harm to defendant. . . . It is therefore in the public interest . . .. Thus, this Court will

enjoin defendant ....
158. See Safeway Inc. v. CESC Plaza Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 2d 439, 467 (E.D. Va, 2003) (citing
Nat'l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990) ("According to circuit
precedent, a permanent injunction is an appropriate remedy'where (i) there is no adequate remedy
at law, (ii) the balance of the equities favors the moving party, and (iii) the public interest is
served.' ").

159. See Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 968 (8th Cir. 2005).
160. See Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship(and the DoctrinalTrain
Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L. 1, 31 (2012); Roberts, supra note 4, at 1034. For
the same objection to Knudson, see Thomas, supra note 14, at 1073 n.59 (criticizing the decision
for invoking the irreparable injury rule even though "commentators have explained that this
irreparable injury rule is in fact dead in our modern times, posing no impediment to the award of
equitable relief').
161. See, e.g., 1 DOBBS, supra note 48, at 125; LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 8-9 ("[Ilrreparable
injury is equivalent to no adequate remedy."); Epstein, supra note 139, at 490 (" '[IUrreparable
injury' and 'inadequate' damages, are mirror images of each other."); James M. Fischer, The
"Right"toInjunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
1, 10 n.38 (2007) ("Unfortunately, the test ... continues the confusing practice of treating
irreparable injury and inadequacy of the remedy at law as distinct factors; they are not."); Roberts,
supra note 4, at 1036 (referring to "the irreparable injury factor and the (strangely) separate
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scholars, 162 think these are actually two formulations of a single
doctrine: an injury is considered irreparable if there is no adequate
remedy at law.
This doctrine is the very one that Laycock had argued was dead,
in the sense of "add[ing] nothing to the other grounds of decision in
cases where [they are] invoked." 163 To be clear, these formulations had
never disappeared from what courts said was required before an
injunction would issue. Rather, Laycock's argument was that the
irreparable injury rule and the idea of legal remedies being inadequate
should be discarded and already were in effect irrelevant.164 Now, after
eBay, this reasserted doctrine is fully half of the test for permanent

inadequate-legal-remedies factor"); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 585 (1952) (describing the irreparable injury rule and the requirement of no adequateremedies at law as "closely related, if not identical"); Fleet Wholesale Supply Co. v. Remington
Arms Co., 846 F.2d 1095, 1098 (7th Cir.) (Easterbrook, J.) ("To say that the injury is irreparable
means that the methods of repair (remedies at law) are inadequate."); Canadian Lumber Trade
Alliance v. United States, 30 C.I.T. 892, 896 & n. 4 (2006) (pointedly combining these parts of the
eBay test) affd, 517 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Some have argued that to avoid confusion
"irreparable injury" should be used for preliminary relief and "no adequate remedy at law" for
permanent injunctions. See Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.
1992) (Posner, J.) (arguing for this distinction and reading "irreparable" as meaning the injury is
"not rectifiable by the entry of a final judgment"); OWEN M. Fiss & DOUG RENDLEMAN,
INJUNCTIONS 59 (2d ed. 1984).
162.

See DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 81-82 (3d ed. 2002)

(treating irreparable injury as a way to show there is no adequate remedy at law); David L.
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548-549 (1985) (concluding that
traditionally the requirement of no adequate remedy at law was jurisdictional, whereas
irreparable injury was a consideration for the court when deciding whether to exercise its
jurisdiction); Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
382, 392-93 (1983) (finding that courts frequently collapse irreparable injury and the lack of an
adequate remedy at law, but suggesting differences in timing and scope: adequacy is a question
about the fairness of giving an injunction to a plaintiff who could instead have sought "a less
onerous remedy," such as damages; irreparable injury is a question about other proceedings,
including criminal proceedings, and whether they "are likely to repair, in a rough sense, the harm
plaintiff seeks to avert by injunction"); see also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S.
139, 162 (finding no irreparable injury at the permanent injunction stage because in a future suit
an equitable remedy could protect plaintiffs' rights-a point that could not be made under the
heading of "no adequate remedy at law"); California v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 255, 258-59 (1938) ("For
we are of opinion that there was adequate opportunity to test at law the applicability and
constitutionality of the Acts of Congress; and that no danger is shown of irreparable injury if that
course is pursued."). For other cases suggesting a distinction between irreparable injury and the
lack of an adequate remedy at law, see infra note 305.
163. LAYCOCK, supranote 3, at 283.
164. See id. at 7 ("I do not argue merely that the irreparable injury rule should be abandoned;
I argue that it has been abandoned in all but rhetoric."); id. at 283 ("The rhetoric thrives, but the
rule itself is dead.").
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injunctions, a test that the Court pointedly did not limit to patent
law. 165
The third part of the eBay test, the "balance of hardships," is also
traditional in equity. It refers to an inquiry into how the injunction will
affect each of the parties, including a consideration of each party's
fault. 166 This traditional equitable inquiry is often called "balancing the
equities" or "the undue hardship defense." 167 It was not described by the
Court, and in the existing case law it is not "crisply formulated," 168 but
it generally has two main principles. The first is that a court should not
grant an equitable remedy if the costs to the defendant greatly exceed
the benefits to the plaintiff; the second is that a court should show this
forbearance only if the defendant acted in good faith.169 Both principles
distinguish the inquiry from standard cost-benefit analysis. This
inquiry has usually been seen not as an element of the plaintiffs claim
for equitable relief (as eBay implies), but as a defense to a claim for such
relief. 170
The final part of the eBay test, the public interest, is also a longstanding concern of equity. The Court has said that "[tlhe history of
equity jurisdiction is the history of regard for public consequences in
employing the extraordinary remedy of the injunction." 17 1 Here, too, the

165. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding that when a court
issues an injunction its "discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of
equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards").
166. See Laycock, supra note 160, at 2-7; David Schoenbrod, The Immortality of Equitable
Balancing, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 17, 18-19 (2010); see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 193 (1978) ("As a general matter it may be said that '[s]ince all or almost all equitable
remedies are discretionary, the balancing of equities and hardships is appropriate in almost any
case as a guide to the chancellor's discretion.'" (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES 52 (1973))). For
classic examples of "balancing the equities," see Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595
(Colo. 1951); Peters v. Archambault, 278 N.E. 2d 729, 735-36 & n.9 (Mass. 1972) (Tauro, C.J.,
dissenting).
167. See Laycock, supra note 160, at 2-3.
168. Id. at 19.
169. See id. at 2-7; Smith, Property, Equity, and the Rule of Law, supra note 49; see also
McCLINTOCK, supra note 132, at 384 ("In suits to compel the removal of structures which encroach
on the property of others, many courts refuse the injunction if the defendant acted innocently and
great hardship would result to him, but grant it, regardless of the balance of the hardships, if the
encroachment was willful."); id. at 387 ("The relative economic hardship that the granting of the
injunction will cause to the defendant is a factor to be considered in the balancing of the equities,
but it ought not to lead to a refusal of an injunction unless it very greatly outweighs the injury to
the plaintiff.").
170. See Laycock, supra note 160, at 29-30; Rendleman, supra note 4, at 85. Even so, it was
included in some of the injunction tests used in state and federal courts before eBay. See supra
notes 154-59.
171. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). The Court usually (though
certainly not always) points to the public interest as a reason for restraint, that is, as a justification
for either declining to give an equitable remedy or for carefully delimiting its scope. For invocations
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Court took a traditional concern of equity and then, with less support
in the equity tradition, presented it as something the plaintiff must
demonstrate in order to receive an injunction.17 2
Therefore the critics are right that the Court seemed to stumble
onto a new injunction test and that the test has its infelicities and
redundancies. 17 3 Still, the Court's description of the test could be
reformulated, with a change of article and a change of tacit emphasis,
to be more correct. The test in eBay is not "the traditional four-factor
test," but it is "a traditional four-factor test." 174 Even so, the most
fundamental objection to eBay from scholars of remedies is not to the
Court's overclaiming. It is to the Court's entrenchment of doctrinal
formulations that distinguish legal and equitable remedies: the
irreparable injury rule and "no adequate remedy at law"
requirement.1 7 5
The Court has not retreated. In a more recent case that arose
under an entirely different statute, the National Environmental Policy
Act, the Court invoked eBay as prescribing the test that "[a] plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy." 7 6 In that case, Monsanto
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,177 the Court made absolutely clear that the
eBay test should not be limited to patent law. 178 Accordingly, the test
has been widely applied by the lower federal courts to requests for

of the public interest, see, for example, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2538 (2014); Salazar
v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010) (plurality opinion); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.
305, 312-13 (1982); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 440-41 (1944); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-330 (1944); Virginian Ry. Co. v.
Sys. Fed'n. No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937); see also LAYCOCK, supranote 3, at 223 & 234 n.80.
172. This criticism is mitigated somewhat by the Court's negative formulation: "A plaintiff
must demonstrate ... that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction."
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (emphasis added). If there is no reason
to think an injunction would affect the public interest, either for good or ill, then this part of the
test is satisfied.
173. See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator" A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 696 (2009) (noting the
unexplained use of the past tense in the Court's formulation of the irreparable injury rule);
LAYCOCK, supra note 150, at 426 (same); Laycock, supra note 160, at 29-30 (noting that undue
hardship is a defense instead of an element of a plaintiffs claim).
174. A minority critique of eBay is that the content of its test is insufficiently traditional,
because it reduces equity to a test that is "not exhaustive of equity's concerns" and requires four
independent showings instead of traditional equitable balancing. See Gergen, Golden & Smith,
supra note 10, at 208-214.
175. See supra note 161.
176. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156-57 (2010) (quoting eBay, 547
U.S. at 391).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 155-58.
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permanent injunctions in a huge variety of cases, 179 though it is not, at
least not yet, applied in every case where a plaintiff seeks an injunction
from a federal court.18 0
B. The New TraditionalTests for PreliminaryRelief
The Court has also extended the eBay test to the law of
preliminary injunctions. 18 1 An initial step in this direction came in
Munaf v. Geren,182 where lower federal courts had issued preliminary
injunctions blocking the transfer of American citizens to Iraqi custody
for criminal trial. Writing for the entire Court, Chief Justice Roberts
rebuked the lower courts for failing to engage in the proper analysis for
a preliminary injunction. 183 "We begin with the basics," he said, and he
proceeded to emphasize that a preliminary injunction is "an
extraordinary and drastic remedy" that is "never awarded as of
right." 184 He also noted that federal courts should issue a preliminary
injunction only after a showing of "likelihood of success on the
merits," 18 5 a step elided by the lower courts. Chief Justice Roberts then
moved from critique of the preliminary injunction to the merits. He said
that to consider the merits in this procedural posture had "long been

179. E.g., Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 422-23 (2d Cir. 2013)
(applying test when deciding whether to enjoin a state's enforcement of a preempted state statute);
Curtis v. Alcoa, Inc., 525 F. App'x 371, 380 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying test to claim for injunction
under ERISA and the Labor Management Relations Act); Yowell v. Abbey, 532 F. App'x 708, 710
(9th Cir. 2013) (reversing district court for failure to apply test to claim against the Bureau of Land
Management); Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 706 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (applying test to injunction against interference with sale of assets by receiver); United
States v. City of New York, No. 07-cv-2067 (NGG) (RLM), 2010 WL 4137536 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19,
2010) (applying test to Title VII claim); see also Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 78 n.7 (2d Cir.
2010) ("[Although today we are not called upon to extend eBay beyond the context of copyright
cases, we see no reason that eBay would not apply with equal force to an injunction in any type of
case.").
180. E.g., Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2012)
(noting that the Ninth Circuit "has not yet determined whether irreparable harm must be shown
in order to obtain injunctive relief in all types of cases," and noting division in post-eBay cases in
the circuit); O'Sullivan v. City of Chicago, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (declining to
apply eBay to a request for an injunction under Title VII).
181. Or, since the eBay test can be seen as something borrowed from preliminary injunctions,
the Court could be seen as moving the eBay test back to the law of preliminary injunctions.
182. 553 U.S. 674, 689-91 (2008).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 689-90 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In another part of the
opinion the Court said that habeas corpus was "governed by equitable principles." Id. at 693
(quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963)). Although the Court has in recent decades been
inclined to invoke "equitable principles" to grant habeas and to deny it, there is no doubt that
habeas is classically a legal remedy. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
185. Id. at 690.
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the rule" in "the ordinary practice in equity as administered in England
and this country." 8 6
Individually, none of these points in Munaf was remarkable. It
has often been said that preliminary injunctions are extraordinary, that
they are not awarded as of right, and that they require a showing of
some likelihood of success on the merits.18 7 But all of these points were
elective: the Court could easily have reversed in Munaf without even
considering the soundness of the preliminary injunction. 88 Munaf
underscores the Court's emphasis on the distinctiveness of equitable
remedies and the importance of considering equity's past.
The next step, and the most important one for extending eBay to
preliminary injunctions, was taken five months later in Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, IneC.1 89 A district court had granted
an injunction against U.S. Navy sonar training exercises, relying on the
authority of the National Environmental Policy Act. 90 In reaching that
result, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs met the Ninth
Circuit requirement of "a 'possibility' of irreparable harm." 19 1 The
Supreme Court reversed, and the test it applied largely mirrored
eBay-with two adaptations for preliminary injunctions. The test
combined "irreparable injury" and "no adequate remedy at law," and it
added the requirement of likelihood of success on the merits.1 92 The
Court reiterated the importance of irreparable injury and stressed that
the plaintiffs irreparable injury must be "likely" and not merely
possible. 19 3 The Court also said that all injunctions, not just preliminary
ones, are "extraordinary remed[ies] that may only be awarded upon a
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." 194 In dissent,

186. Id. at 691 (quoting N.C. R.R. Co. v. Story, 268 U.S. 288, 292 (1925)).
187. See, e.g., I1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2948

(3d ed. 2010).
188. That is not to say the analysis was dicta; it was an alternative rationale.
189. 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Winter was written very quickly-the case was argued on October 8,
2008, and decided on November 12, 2008.
190. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 645 F. Supp. 2d 841, 855 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
191. 555 U.S. at 17, 21 (quoting district court opinion).
192. Id. at 20:
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an
injunction is in the public interest.
eBay was not cited, though the Court did cite the two cases it had relied on as authority for its
eBay test, namely Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987) and Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
193. 555 U.S. at 22 (emphasis in original).
194. Id.
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Justice Ginsburg praised the flexibility of equity, 195 as she had in her
Grupo Mexicano dissent, and she argued that Congress had already
made the policy decision when it chose to require environmental impact
statements.1 96 But unlike her dissent in Grupo Mexicano, her dissent
here was joined by only one other Justice. 197 In Winter, the majority
opinion was not such an easy target. It is one thing to emphasize
equity's discretion and flexibility when the majority seems to be
stopping the development of equity at 1789.198 It is quite another to do
so when the majority agrees that equity is discretionary and flexible
and yet chooses to exercise that discretion in its own way.1 99
Winter is not as counter to the conventional wisdom in remedies
as eBay was, for even the critics of the irreparable injury rule have
conceded that it has some value for preliminary injunctions. 200
Nevertheless, Winter conflicts with that conventional wisdom in two
ways. First, scholars see it as a sign of the Court's commitment to
keeping and extending eBay.201 Second, it is yet another case where the
Court is characterizing equitable relief as exceptional-not just
preliminary injunctions but also permanent injunctions. 202

195. Id. at 43, 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Flexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction.").
196. Id. at 47-51.
197. Justice Ginsburg's dissent was joined by Justice Souter. Two other Justices concurred in
the Court's reversal of the preliminary injunction while suggesting that a narrower stay from the
court of appeals should have remained in place. Id. at 41.
198. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the focus on remedies in 1789 in
the Grupo Mexicano opinion).
199. Justice Ginsburg also noted her view that the majority opinion did not displace the
practice in many lower federal courts of "evaluat[ing] claims for equitable relief on a 'sliding scale,'
sometimes awarding relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success is
very high." 555 U.S. at 49. That suggestion has sparked a small literature. See Jean C. Love,
Teaching PreliminaryInjunctions after Winter, 57 ST. LOuIs U. L.J. 689 (2013); Sarah J. Morath,
A Mild Winter: The Status of EnvironmentalPreliminaryInjunctions, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155
(2013); Rachel A. Weisshaar, Note, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split over
PreliminaryInjunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2012).
200. See supra note 41
201. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 1036.
202. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (reiterating "our characterization of injunctive relief as an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled
to such relief'); see also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010) ("An
injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a matter of
course.").
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A few months after Winter, the Court took a similar approach in
establishing rules about stays. 203 In Nken v. Holder,204 the Court had to
consider whether an immigration statute that tightly restricted
injunctive relief also applied to stays of removal. 205 The statute said that
"no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final
order," 206 with a narrow exception for circumstances in which the alien
could show "by clear and convincing evidence" that the order was
"prohibited as a matter of law." 20 7 Once again Chief Justice Roberts
wrote for the Court (though this time Justices Alito and Thomas
dissented), and he read "enjoin" as encompassing injunctions but not
stays. 208 In reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice admitted that it
was unclear what, if any, effect the relevant subsection would still have
because it could be circumvented easily. 209 Nevertheless, he argued that
this reading of the statute was consistent with traditional differences
between injunctions and stayS 210 and would allow the stay to "fulfill [its]
203. A stay pending judicial review is not exactly an equitable remedy, being neither
traditionally limited to equity nor a remedy even in the broad sense of what "the court can do for
you if you win" or what it "can do to you if you lose." Laycock, supra note 17, at 165. Nevertheless,
it is conventionally treated alongside the preliminary injunction, see LAYCOCK, supra note 150, at
445, and injunctions and stays have affected each other's doctrinal development. For an example
from English equity, namely the borrowing from the law of stays to reshape the law of anti-suit
injunctions, see THOMAS RAPHAEL, THE ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION 48-51 (2008).

204. 556 U.S. 418 (2009).
205. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("HIRIRA"), Pub
L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012)).
206. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (emphasis added).
207. Id.
208. Nken, 556 U.S. at 428-32.
209. See id. at 431-32 (noting that "the exact role of subsection (f)(2)" under the view the
Court was adopting was "not easy to explain," and then speculating without much conviction about
what purpose it might serve). Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011), could be seen as another case
in which the Court resisted statutory limitations on traditional equitable powers. And eBay itself
can be seen as expressing the commitment of the Court to read federal statutes, whenever it can,
as invoking-and not altering-the judicially developed law of equitable remedies. For arguments
in favor of this commitment, see Bray, supranote 49, at 8-17 (arguing that Congress must speak
clearly in order to displace traditional equitable principles); David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of
an Injunction:A Principle to Replace Balancingthe Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN.
L. REV. 627, 657-58 (1988) (noting that balancing the equities has become a background value that
legislation incorporates); see also Erin Morrow Hawley, The Equitable Anti-Injunction Act, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 81, 112-21 (2014) (describing the federal courts' reading of the AntiInjunction Act as in harmony with background equitable principles). For a contrary perspective,
see Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485, 489 (2010)
(rejecting equitable balancing for injunctions to enforce federal statutes, and arguing that it
conflicts with the separation of powers). But see Schoenbrod, supra note 166 (offering rebuttal).
210. The Court said that an injunction "is a means by which a court tells someone what to do
or not to do" and "operate[s] in personam." Nken, 556 U.S. at 428 (quoting 1 H. JOYCE, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW RELATING TO INJUNCTIONS § 1 (1909)). A stay, by contrast, "operates upon the judicial
proceeding itself," and even though it can have the same effect as a preliminary injunction, it
produces this effect "by temporarily suspending the source of the authority to act-the order or
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historic office." 2 1 1 Instead of the immigration statute's very restrictive
test, therefore, the Court instructed lower courts to apply "the
traditional standard" for stays. That standard, distilled in earlier cases,
resembles the Winter test. 2 12 The Court said that stays were never
granted as "a matter of right," 213 and that when granting them the lower
courts should consider irreparable injury and the public interest case
by case without any resort to categorical presumptions. 2 1 4 Here, too, the
Court's work had hallmarks of the new equity jurisprudence-the turn
to tradition, the emphasis on judicial discretion, and the entrenchment
of the irreparable injury rule. 2 15

C. The New Traditional Scope of an EquitableDefense
The Court's next case on equitable principles was Petrella v
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 216 decided last Term. The case arose out of
a dispute over the copyright to the screenplay for the movie Raging
Bull.2 1 7 The copyright was claimed by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and by
Paula Petrella, the author's daughter. She sued MGM for copyright
infringement, but she waited about a decade to do so. As a result, the
judgment in question-not by directing an actor's conduct." Id. at 428-29. As a description of the
practice of Chancery, however, that distinction would be overstated. When Chancery issued an
order-whether the order was called a stay or an injunction (or, as it sometimes was, an "injunction
for stay")-it would characteristically operate only upon the litigants, not upon the law courts
themselves. See, e.g., MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 9 (stating that the Court of Chancery "never
presumed to send to [the courts of law] such mandates as the Court of King's Bench habitually
sent to inferior courts," a principle he illustrated by noting that an injunction "was addressed not
to the judges, but to the party").
211. Nken, 556 U.S. at 432.
212. Id. at 434:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed
on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in
the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
(quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)); see also id. (noting "substantial overlap
between these and the factors governing preliminary injunctions").
213. Id. at 427, 433; see also id. at 438 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing a "stay of removal"
as "an extraordinary remedy that should not be granted in the ordinary case, much less awarded
as of right"); cf. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006) (describing "a stay of execution" as
"an equitable remedy" that "is not available as a matter of right").
214. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435-36 (rejecting the idea that removal is "categorically" an
irreparable injury, and warning lower courts not to "simply assume" the result of the "balance of
hardships" inquiry).
215. In another context involving preliminary relief-a request for a stay ofjudgment pending
disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari-Chief Justice Roberts also mentioned the need for
a showing of irreparable injury. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1621, 1621
(2014) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers).
216. 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014).
217. Id. at 1970-71.
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lower courts denied all relief, invoking laches. 218 The Supreme Court
had to decide what the scope of the laches defense would be, at least in
federal copyright law.
The parties offered the Court diametrically opposed positions.
Petrella argued that laches should not apply to any claims in the case
because the statute of limitations was the only limit on the timing of
suit. 2 19 MGM argued that the lower courts were right to deny all relief,
legal and equitable. 220 The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938 made it pass6, MGM argued, to think of laches as a
distinctively equitable defense.22 1 Each side could appeal to some lower
court decisions that had treated the line between legal and equitable
remedies as irrelevant for determining the scope of laches (either
excluding laches for all claims or allowing it for all claims). 222
But once again the Court turned to the history of equitable
remedies. In an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg (and assigned to
her by Justice Scalia), the Court kept to a traditional understanding of
laches as an equitable defense. The Court held (1) that laches is
available as a defense, notwithstanding the statute of limitations; 2 3 (2)
that laches is a defense only to claims for equitable remedies; 224 (3) that
laches can either knock out an equitable remedy entirely or shape its
scope; 225 (4) that only in extraordinary circumstances may laches bar
equitable relief entirely; 226 and (5) that laches is available only to

218. On laches, see 1 DOBBS, supra note 48, at 103-08; see also Bray, supra note 49, at 1-2
("Laches is a defense that was developed by courts of equity, and it is typically raised in cases
where a plaintiff has delayed her suit without good reason.").
219. Brief for Petitioner, Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014) (No.
12-1315), 2013 WL 6665055 at *14-15.
220. Brief for Respondents, Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014) (No.
12-1315), 2013 WL 6665057 at *11.
221. Id. at *10, *39-42.
222. See id. at *39 (citing Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237, 1247-48 (7th Cir. 1991)); Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 219 at *29-30((citing Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243
F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001)).
223. See Petrella, 134 S. Ct at 1967; see also Bray, supra note 49, at 8-18.
224. See Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1967 (holding that laches "cannot be invoked to preclude
adjudication of a claim for damages" but may bar or limit "equitable relief"); id. at 1973-74 (rooting
the distinction in the history of laches as an equitable defense); see also Bray, supra note 49, at 28, 17-18.
225. See Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1967 (holding that laches may "bar at the very threshold" the
equitable relief the plaintiff seeks, or it may "be brought to bear at the remedial stage" to limit the
equitable relief a court gives); id. at 1978-79 (recognizing that laches may entirely bar or merely
"adjust" the scope of equitable relief); see also Bray, supra note 49, at 18.
226. See Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1967 ("As to equitable relief, in extraordinary circumstances,
laches may bar at the very threshold the particular relief requested by the plaintiff."); id. at 1977
(requiring "extraordinary circumstances" for the "curtailment" of equitable relief "at the very
outset of the litigation"); id. at 1978 (noting that although the plaintiffs delay may affect the scope
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2 31
legislation-overriding, office of laches."

-

shorten the statutory time period but not to extend it.227 In reaching
these conclusions, the Court noted that laches had been "developed by
courts of equity." 228 It insisted that the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure did not change "the substantive and remedial
principles" applied by the federal courts, including the principle that
laches was available only against claims for equitable relief. 229 The
Court described its approach as traditional: it was "adher[ing]" 230 to the
"understandings, past and present, of the essentially gap-filling, not
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Kennedy, would have allowed laches to block all of Petrella's
claims for relief.2 32 Although the dissenting Justices eschewed the

majority's distinction between legal and equitable remedies, they too
considered laches an equitable doctrine in a certain sense, i.e., a
doctrine that "avoid[s] the unfairness that might arise were legal rules
to apply strictly to every case no matter how unusual the
circumstances." 2 3 3 And they appealed to equity's ancient past.2 34
And so in Petrella a majority of the Justices concluded that
laches is an equitable defense good only against equitable claims, and
all of the Justices looked to equity's past as a guide for equity's present.
D. Two Themes: Exceptionalism and Discretion
The Court's exposition of equitable principles has been
dominated by two themes. One is the exceptionalism of equitable
remedies, and the other is the pervasive discretion that courts have
when granting them. Both themes are characteristic of centuries of
cases on equitable remedies. Yet the exposition of each theme is

of equitable remedies given, "extraordinary" circumstances are needed to deny equitable relief
entirely); see also Bray, supra note 49, at 13-14, 17.
227. See Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1967 (calling it "undisputed" that the statute of limitations in
the Copyright Act "bars relief of any kind" for violations before the statutory period); id. at 1971
(stating that "[n]o relief' is available for infringement before the statutory period); see also Bray,
supra note 49, at 12, 14.
228. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1973.
229. Id. at 1973-74; see also Bray, supra note 49, at 2-4.
230. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1979-86 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
233. Id. at 1979 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
234. Ancient is not elegant variation for old. Justice Breyer's dissent invoked the famous
discussion of equity in The Nicomachean Ethics. Id. It was the first U.S. Supreme Court opinion
to do so in more than a century. See Beley v. Naphtaly, 169 U.S. 353, 360 (1898). On Aristotle and
equity, see infra note 238 and accompanying text.
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imperfect, both because of what the Court does say and what it does not
say.
The theme of exceptionalism is evident when the Court describes
the preliminary injunction and the permanent injunction as
extraordinary remedies. 235 In addition to these express descriptions,
every test the Court has promulgated-the eBay test for permanent
injunctions, the Winter test for preliminary injunctions, and the Nken
test for stays-has included a requirement that the moving party show
irreparable injury. 236 Moreover, for two of these tests, the Court has
specifically said that it is not enough to show merely a possibility of
irreparable injury. 237
The association between equity and exceptional circumstances
is ancient. Aristotle described equity (tiCiKeta) as a solution to the
problem of generality in lawmaking. 238 Although there were no separate
equitable courts in ancient Athens, 239 Aristotle's description would be
invoked centuries later to justify the Court of Chancery's existence and
role. 2 4 0 American courts and commentators have also frequently
characterized equitable remedies as extraordinary or exceptional. 241
235. On permanent injunctions, see Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 16566 (2010); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428, 432 (2009). On preliminary injunctions, see Winter
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
236. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434; Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
237. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-435; Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
238. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1795-96

(Jonathan Barnes ed., W.D. Ross transl., J.O. Urmson rev., 1984) (c. 384 B.C.). There is a large
body of philosophical literature on Aristotelian equity. See, e.g., John Tasioulas, Justice, Equity
and Law, in 5 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 147 (Edward Craig ed., 1998); Allan

Beever, Aristotle on Equity, Law, and Justice, 10 LEG. THEORY 33 (2004); Martha C. Nussbaum,
Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 83 (1993); see also Charles M. Gray, The Boundaries
of the Equitable Function, 20 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 192, 218 & n.65 (1976).
239. The legal system of ancient Athens did emphasize equitable considerations, but these
tended to be reflected in jury decisionmaking. See Adriaan Lanni, 'Verdict Most Just": The Modes
of Classical Athenian Justice, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 277, 278 (2004) (describing how Athenian
law generally gave a large place to equitable considerations yet carved out certain classes of cases
to which they did not apply).
240. See MARK FORTIER, THE CULTURE OF EQUITY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 60-76 (2005);
RENDLEMAN, supra note 54, at 141-47; CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT OR
DIALOGUES BETWEEN A DOCTOR OF DIVINITY AND A STUDENT IN THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 53-54

(London, Nutt & Gosling 1721); Tasioulas, supra note 238, at 150.
241. See, e.g., Gunn v. Univ. Comm. to End the War in Vietn., 399 U.S. 383, 389 (1970) ("An
injunctive order is an extraordinary writ, enforceable by the power of contempt."); THE FEDERALIST
No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The great and primary use of a court of equity is to give relief in
extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules." (qualifying footnote omitted)); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence
of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 66-67 (1984) (recognizing a narrower ground for Younger v. Harris,
namely that "[1]acking were any of the exceptional circumstances that might have triggered
equitable intervention"); Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, supra note 49, at 270
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They have made these characterizations in connection with the "no
adequate remedy at law" requirement and the remedial hierarchy, 242
for both imply that legal remedies are the norm. Conversely, the
scholars who have sharply criticized the adequacy requirement and the
remedial hierarchy have also dissented from the idea that there is
anything exceptional about equitable remedies. 243
There are varieties of exceptionalism, however, and it is
important to be clear about exactly what kind the Court seems to be
embracing. The Court has not suggested that permanent injunctions
are exceptional in the sense of being rare or unusual. 244 They are not.
Federal courts grant many permanent injunctions, and there are large
pockets of the law, even after eBay, where a plaintiff who succeeds on
the merits will usually receive a permanent injunction. 245
Instead, the Court seems to have embraced another variety of
exceptionalism-that equitable remedies are departures from a norm.
That norm is legal remedies. Any departure from the norm demands
justification; even if it is easily made, it still must be made. To put the
point differently, the Court is insisting that a trial judge who wants to
give an equitable remedy must make an explicit finding that legal
remedies are not adequate (i.e., the finding that allows a departure from
the norm of legal remedies). But the Court has not made it difficult to
make that finding.
Admittedly,
it is confusing for these varieties of
exceptionalism-one statistical and one more conceptual-to travel
under the same name. That confusion is hard to avoid, though, since
seemingly every English word that describes a departure from a norm

("Generally, equity as a decision-making mode manifests itself as an exceptional safety valve.");
see also sources cited supra note 24.
242. On that hierarchy, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 5 ("I conclude that the irreparable injury rule is
dead.. . . Equally abandoned are such corollary expressions as 'injunctions are an extraordinary
remedy.").
244. By contrast, one opinion did describe preliminary injunctions and stays as exceptional in
the sense of being rare. See, e.g., Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 437 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(describing a "stay of removal" as "an extraordinary remedy that should not be granted in the
ordinary case" and calling for "empirical data on the number of stays granted").
245. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1976 n.19 (suggesting that
a plaintiff who proves copyright infringement "will likely gain forward-looking injunctive relief
stopping the defendant's repetition of infringing acts"); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed,
Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2141-2142 (2013) (noting that even
after eBay "[p]racticing entities are usually able to get injunctions" against patent infringers).
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can also imply infrequency. 246 "Conceptual exceptionalism" may be as
clear as it gets.
A second theme in the Court's treatment of equitable principles
is discretion. 247 In eBay, for example, the Court said "[t]he decision to
grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable
discretion by the district court." 248 The tests that the Court has given
for permanent injunctions (eBay), preliminary injunctions (Winter), and
stays (Nken) all structure the decisionmaking of a district court, yet
every part of every test involves ample discretion. Likewise, in Petrella,
the Court recognized that lower courts have "considerable leeway" when
"fashioning equitable remedies." 249
The Court has rejected the idea that equitable remedies are a
matter of right, 250 and it has instructed the lower courts not to rely on
categorical presumptions about how the different factors should come
out in a class of cases. To date, the Court has rejected presumptions

246. Consider exceptional, extraordinary, special, unusual, remarkable, anomalous, and
atypical. The reverse is not true, for there is at least one English word for something that is rare
but not necessarily a departure from a norm: infrequent.
247. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 433 (calling the issuance of a stay "an exercise of judicial discretion"
the appropriateness of which "is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case" (quoting
Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)).
248. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). This embrace of
discretion-in a majority opinion by Justice Thomas-suggests a more complex picture of Justice
Thomas's view of discretion than the notion that he has "quasi-religious devotion to constitutional
rules over standards, born of his evident hostility to judicial discretion." Jamal Greene, Justice
Thomas
and
Korematsu
Redux,
BALKINIZATION
(June
26,
2013),
http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/justice-thomas-and-korematsu-redux.html,
archived at http:/f
perma.cc/X2PV-EQJG.
249. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1979 (citation omitted); see also id. at 1978-79 & n.22 (using
adjustment or a cognate three times, in the space of about a page, to refer to decisionmaking about
equitable remedies).
250. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156-58 (2010) (permanent
injunctions); Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010) (plurality opinion) (equitable relief
generally); Nken, 556 U.S. at 427, 433 (stays); Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24
(preliminary injunctions); id. at 32 (permanent injunctions); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689690 (2008) (preliminary injunctions); eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C., concurring) (permanent
injunctions). In Petrella, the Court referred to a copyright owner's "right to prospective injunctive
relief . .. in most cases." 134 S. Ct. at 1976. Since there is no "right" to an injunction, the most
charitable reading is that the Court was using the term rather loosely, as something like a mere
probability. That conclusion fits (1) the phrase "in most cases"; (2) the immediately following
footnote where the Court gives the gloss that a plaintiff who proves copyright infringement "will
likely gain" an injunction against further infringement, id. 1976 n.19; and (3) a passage later in
the opinion where the Court emphasizes that the scope of equitable relief is always subject to
"adjustment" based on many considerations, id. at 1978-79 & n.22.
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about irreparable injury, 251 the balance of hardships, 252 the public
interest, 253 the ultimate question of whether an injunction should
issue, 254 and the likelihood of success on the merits. 255
A particularly striking example of this rejection of presumptions
is eBay itself, in which the Court effectively reversed both the district
court and the appellate court for using opposite presumptions. The
Court recognized what it was doing: "Just as the District Court erred in
its categorical denial of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals erred in
its categorical grant of such relief." 256 Both concurrences in eBay-even
though they reflected different views of the underlying patent policy
questions-agreed in specifically rejecting categorical rules for
equitable remedies. 257 Similarly, in Petrella the Court noted
considerations that would be relevant on remand, 258 although it
underscored the district court's discretion. In short, the Court's new
equitable tests emphatically insist on, and structure, the exercise of
judicial discretion in particular cases.
Discretion, too, is deeply rooted in the tradition of equity. Much
of the literature on equity over the last five hundred years has centered
251. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 435 (rejecting a presumption that the burden of removal from the
United States is irreparable injury); see also id. at 438 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concluding that
"there must be a particularized, irreparable harm beyond mere removal to justify a stay").
252. See id. at 436 (rejecting any assumption that "[o]rdinarily, the balance of hardships will
weigh heavily" in the favor of an applicant for a stay of removal); see also Winter, 555 U.S. at 24
("In each case, courts 'must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on
each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.' " (emphasis added) (quoting
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987))).
253. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 436 (rejecting a presumption of no harm to the public interest when
a stay of removal is granted).
254. See Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. at 157.
255. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 690 (rejecting the lower court's idea that where jurisdictional
questions were difficult, a preliminary injunction could issue without a showing of "a likelihood of
success on the merits").
256. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); see also id. at 393
("[Tlraditional equitable principles do not permit such broad classifications.... To the extent that
the District Court adopted such a categorical rule, then, its analysis cannot be squared with the
principles of equity . . . ."); see also Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149
(Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Although eBay abolishes our general rule that an injunction normally will issue
when a patent is found to have been valid and infringed, it does not swing the pendulum in the
opposite direction."). For a view that this is the central theme of eBay, see Tracy A. Thomas, eBay
Rx, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 187, 187-93 (2008); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy
Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 779-80 (2013); Anthony DiSarro, A Farewell
to Harms:Against Presuming IrreparableInjury in ConstitutionalLitigation, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 743, 772-75 (2012). For criticism of eBay and an argument for a patent holder's presumptive
entitlement to injunctive relief, see COTTER, supra note 139, at 105-07.
257. Compare eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (rejecting "a general rule that
such injunctions should issue"), with id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the Court
should apply eBay's test "without resort to categorical rules").
258. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1978-79 (2014).
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on this characteristic, and the arguments are predictable. Critics, such
as John Selden or more recently Daniel Farber and John Yoo, have
objected that equity is a cloak for arbitrary judicial policymaking.2 59
They see "the chancellor's conscience" as mere personal whim, varying
as much from one chancellor to the next as "the chancellor's foot." 2 60 In
contrast, judges granting equitable remedies have traditionally noted
both the value and the limits of equitable discretion. As to value, judges
have said that equitable discretion allows them to fashion equitable
remedies that are appropriate to the justice of the particular case, to
choose rigor or forbearance as the case demands. 261 As to limits, it has
long been a commonplace that equitable discretion is bounded. 26 2 Even
in equity, Chief Judge Cardozo said, "there are signposts for the
traveler." 263
259. See JOHN SELDEN, EQUITY, in TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN,

ESQ. 43, 43-44 (1689); Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental
Injunctions, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 513, 526-27 (1984); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the
Chancellor'sFoot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121,
1162-65

(1996);

see also ANTONIN

SCALIA

&

BRYAN A.

GARNER,

READING

LAW:

THE

INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS v (2012) (quoting Blackstone's quip that law without equity is
better than equity without law).
260. See SELDEN, supra note 259, at 43-44 ("Equity in Law, is the same that the Spirit is in
Religion, what every one pleases to make it."). But see BAKER, supra note 36, at 178 ("Good
conscience was not arbitrary."); Richard Hedlund, The Theological Foundations of Equity's
Conscience, 4 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 119 (2015) (arguing that "equity's conscience is not
subjective or capricious").
261. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) ("[T]he courts will be guided by
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in
shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These
cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power."); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 71 & n.9 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944); Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 517 (Wash. 1986) (including, among the
"fundamental principles applicable to a request for an injunction," that "[tihe trial court is vested
with a broad discretionary power to shape and fashion injunctive relief to fit the particularfacts,
circumstances, and equities of the case before it.").
262. See Heine v. Bd. of Levee Comm'rs, 86 U.S. 655, 658 (1873) (rejecting the notion that a
court of equity may "depart from all precedent and assume an unregulated power of administering
abstract justice at the expense of well-settled principles"); Lord Nottingham's Prolegomena of
Chancery and Equity, in NOTTINGHAM, supra note 68, at 200 ("[T]he Lord Chancellor must order
his conscience after the rules and grounds of the laws of this realm."); BAKER, supra note 72, at
109-10; HAMBURGER, supranote 72, at 142-43 (describing "equitable discretion" in the eighteenth
century as "a discernment of circumstances" sometimes "beyond reconsideration on error, but this
was not to say it was necessarily beyond rules of either equity or law"); Fischer, supra note 161, at
9-10 ("To note that equitable relief is a supplemental remedy or subject to judicial discretion is
not to say that injunctions are second order, mercurial remedies available according to the vagaries
of the court. This was the central point of Chief Justice Robert's concurrence in eBay." (footnote
omitted)); Andrew Kull, Ponzi, Property, and Luck, 100 IOWA L. REV. 291, 300 (2014) ("There are
equity problems that depend on the length of the Chancellor's foot, but the basic rules validating
and invalidating ownership of property are not among them.").
263. Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem, 172 N.E. 455, 457 (N.Y. 1930).
This is true of judicial discretion generally. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D.
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The Court's new emphasis on equitable discretion deserves a
mixed assessment. First, the positive. Although this emphasis is new,
in the sense of being a departure from some earlier cases that seemed
quick to read statutes as eliminating that discretion, 264 it is broadly
consistent with the tradition of equity. 26 5 It is also consistent with the
blackletter law that equitable remedies are not of right. 266 For example,
Judge Friendly, when illustrating "the necessary leeway [that] is built
into the governing equitable principles," pointed to "the discretion of the
trial court to withhold a permanent injunction as unnecessary even
when the plaintiff has made out all the other elements of his case." 2 6 7
This point should not be misunderstood. It would certainly be unusual
for a court to find that all of the principles for giving an injunction weigh
in favor of issuance and yet not actually issue one. (Indeed, a court that
did so might be reversed. 268 Or not. 269) Rather, the force of the "not of
right" phrase is more subtle and rhetorical. It is a short-hand for a
number of discrete but related ideas: the exceptionalism of equitable

Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[A] motion to [a court's] discretion is a motion, not to its inclination,
but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles."); Henry J. Friendly,
IndiscretionAbout Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 777 (1982) ("A judge's discretion is not boundless
and must be exercised within the applicable rules of law or equity." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
264. One case that is often read that way is Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978). See Farber, supra note 259, at 527 (reviewing several Burger Court environmental cases
and noting with approval that "[i]n none of these cases has the Court reaffirmed the traditional
use of equitable balancing as a means of judicial policymaking"). But see Tenn. Valley Auth., 437
U.S. at 193 ("[A] federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an
injunction for every violation of law."); Schoenbrod, supra note 209, at 648 & n. 102. A passage in
United States v. Oakland CannabisBuyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001), reads Tennessee Valley
Authority along with Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), as standing for the
proposition that a statute authorizing injunctions takes away discretion not to give any relief but
leaves discretion about what relief to give. See Oahland CannabisBuyers, 532 U.S. at 497-98.
265. See supra notes 261-63.
266. See John Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 43, 53-55 (2011);
Rendleman, supra note 4, at 85; cf. Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 274 (7th
Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) ("[I]njunctions are not granted as a matter of course, but only when the
plaintiff's damages remedy is inadequate."). Note, however, that this discretion has never been
characteristic of those substantive areas where equity provided all of the adjudicative rules instead
of being supplementary to the law (e.g., trusts). See Smith, supra note 133, at 1195. In addition,
some statutes mandate injunctions in certain circumstances. See LAYCOCK, supranote 150, at 266.
But as a general rule the Court is on firm ground in saying that injunctions and other equitable
remedies are not available as of right.
267. Friendly, supra note 263, at 778 & n.116. For a recent example, see Signature Flight
Support Corp. v. Landow Aviation Ltd., 442 F. App'x 776, 785 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming where the
district court first applied the eBay test and then, "because injunctive relief ultimately rests in the
discretion of the court, the district court also considered whether the equities supported the
injunction").
268. See Brock v. Big Bear Mkt. No. 3, 825 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1987).
269. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633-36 (1953).

2015]

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEW EQUITY

1043

remedies; the relatively high degree of discretion in the principles for
granting injunctions; the distinction between rights and remedies; and
the various doctrines that withhold an equitable remedy from those who
have abused their legal rights (such as laches and unclean hands).
Where the Court diverges from both the tradition of equity and
the contemporary practice of the lower courts is in its rejection of
categorical presumptions. In many areas of the law, there are rough
presumptions that in certain categories of cases an injunction will issue
once a violation has been shown. As Judge Posner put it, "Although we
have described the choice between legal and equitable remedies as one
for case-by-case determination, the courts have sometimes picked out
categories of case[s] in which injunctive relief is made the norm. The
best-known example is specific performance of contracts for the sale of
real property." 270 This feature of traditional equity has been ably
explored by Mark Gergen, John Golden, and Henry Smith, who describe
many of the presumptions that structure equitable discretion in
property, contract, and constitutional cases. 271 If the new equity cases
were read to obliterate all equitable presumptions, they would cause a
sea change in the law-a change that the Court could not justify by
appealing to our existing equity tradition. 272
Although some of the new equity cases can easily be read as
absolutely rejecting any presumptions about equitable remedies, a
narrower reading is also plausible. The Court could be understood as
insisting that lower courts resist any presumptions that would make
the injunction decision effectively automatic.2 7 3 This reading would
better comport with "well-established principles of equity."2 74 It would
conform to the Court's recognition in Petrella that a plaintiff who

270. Walgreen, 966 F.2d at 278; see MCCLINTOCK, supra note 132, at 103 (noting that "[i]n
many types of cases, precedents have determined that the remedy at law is either adequate or
inadequate"). One critique of eBay is that it should have recognized a stronger analogy between
real property and intellectual property. See Epstein, supra note 139, at 490.
271. Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 10, at 219-30.
272. For a case recognizing the tension between equitable presumptions and the Court's
recent equity cases, see Seed Servs., Inc. v. Winsor Grain, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1004-05 (E.D.
Cal. 2012).
273. For example, perhaps the strongest rejection of presumptions in the Court's new equity
cases is Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010), where the Court chided the
lower courts for "invert[ing] the proper mode of analysis" by asking "whether there is a good reason
why an injunction should not issue." Id. at 157-58. Even here, though, the Court expressed a
concern that federal courts were in effect making injunctions automatic: "Nor... could any such
error be cured by a court's perfunctory recognition that 'an injunction does not automatically issue.'
" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting district court). For an example of a strong presumption in equity,
but with a narrow opening for a truly extraordinary case, see Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 92
n.68 (1974).
274. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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establishes copyright infringement is "likely" to get an injunction. 27 5 It
would also embody a valuable insight: there should be no presumptions
that make the decision to give an injunction automatic, for they would
keep the lower courts from engaging in the case-specific and opentextured, yet structured, decisionmaking that is characteristic of
equity. This is exactly how the traditional equitable presumptions
work. They do not make equitable relief automatic; they are not per se
rules that make it unnecessary for the judge to closely consider the facts
of the case. 2 76 (Nor is this point limited to equity: the presumption of
innocence in criminal trials does not preclude weighing the evidence
about whether a particular defendant is guilty. 2 7 7 ) For these reasons,
the Court should clarify that the use of traditional equitable
presumptions is compatible with the case-by-case decisionmaking that
it is insisting upon.

The Court's repeated inquiries into the scope and content of
"equitable relief," and its turn to an idealized history and tradition as
the authoritative source for those inquiries, represent an unexpected
and striking revival of equity. It was unexpected, given decades of
scholarship skeptical of equity's past. 2 7 8 More importantly, these cases
are striking because of the doctrines they reinforce. The Court has
emphasized that equitable remedies are never given as of right, may be
given only when there is a showing of irreparable injury, are
exceptional, and are marked by discretion-a discretion that is guided
by traditional tests but exercised case by case.

275. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1976 n.19 (2014).
276. Compare the approach of Judge Posner in Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966
F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992). He noted that "injunctions are not granted as a matter of course, but only
when the plaintiffs damages remedy is inadequate," while also recognizing that in certain
"categories of case[s] . . . injunctive relief is the norm." Id. at 274, 278. On the importance of factual
particularity in equitable decisionmaking, and thus the general need "to eschew the formulation
of per se rules in equity," see Leo E. Strine, Jr., If CorporateAction Is Lawful, Presumably There
Are Circumstancesin Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollaryto the Rule
of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 Bus. LAW. 877 (2005).
277. I am grateful to Jud Campbell for suggesting the analogy.
278. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: The
Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 431 (1935) (commenting on differences in the form of an appeal at
law and equity and concluding that "[a]rchaic nomenclature which carries with it so much of
formality and tradition ought to be abandoned"); see also supra Part II.
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V. TAKING STOCK OF THE COURT AND ITS CRITICS
The criticism of the Court's cases on equitable remedies has been
intense. It has come from scholars who write in remedies, in procedure,
and in the substantive domains affected by the Court's decisions. 279 The
criticism has focused on three aspects of the new equity cases: the use
of history, the representation of doctrine, and the lack of justification.
This Part summarizes these criticisms, evaluating what the critics have
said and what the Court has done.
A. The Use of History
The first criticism is about the history. 280 It is true that the Court
has, at times, struggled in getting the history right, even by the
standards of judicial historiography. Most glaringly, the Court has
called mandamus an equitable remedy. 28 1 As other scholars have noted,
that is a clear mistake: for centuries mandamus has been a legal
remedy. 282 It is true that mandamus is highly discretionary, and that
when deciding whether to grant it a court will take into account
considerations resembling those for equitable remedies. 283 Still, there is
no doubt about how mandamus should be classified. Indeed, the history
is so clear that the Court's description is conceivable only if one thinks
that all nonmonetary remedies are in the domain of equity. But there

279. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
280. The leading criticism in this regard is Langbein, supranote 8.
281. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S.204, 215 (2002) (quoting,
without any reservation, the description in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993)
of "injunction, mandamus, and restitution" as equitable remedies); id. at 234 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (same); CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1879 (2011) (same); see also Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) ("Petitioners seek additional forms of equitable relief,
including mandamus for the release of petitioner Powell's back pay.").
282. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 1321, 1353; Laycock, supra note 4, at 81. For a sketch of
the history of mandamus, especially in relation to the writs of certiorari, habeas corpus, and
prohibition, see S.A. de Smith, The PrerogativeWrits, 2 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 40 (1951). Although there
is at least one instance of mandamus issuing from Chancery, see id. at 44 n.29, by the seventeenth
century it had become clear that this writ "was awarded almost exclusively out of the King's
Bench." Id. at 43-44.
283. See Shapiro, supra note 162, at 572 (noting that even "when discretion was primarily the
province of the Chancellor" there were still legal remedies-certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus,
and prohibition-that were extraordinary, highly discretionary, and not available as a matter of
course). The Court once described mandamus as "a legal remedy ... largely controlled by equitable
principles." In re Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86, 96 (1924); see also In re Int'l Profit Assocs.,
Inc., 274 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. 2009) ("Although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its
issuance is controlled largely by equitable principles."). Rightly or wrongly, similar things have
been said about other traditionally legal remedies. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963)
(habeas corpus); Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18, 24 (1927) (money had and received);
Kopin v. Orange Prods., Inc., 688 A.2d 130, 140 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (quasi-contract).
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have always been nonmonetary remedies outside of equity-not only
mandamus but also relief in replevin, ejectment, and habeas, as well as
in declaratory judgment actions. 284 Similarly, the Court has on occasion
misdescribed the declaratory judgment and habeas as equitable
remedies. 28 5 It has made historical blunders in its description of
restitution, as ably described by John Langbein. 286 And in Petrella the
Court referred to a "right to prospective injunctive relief," 287 though
there is no such right, as the Court seemed to recognize elsewhere in
the same opinion. 288
It is indisputable, then, that the Court has made outright
mistakes about the history of equity. But Langbein goes farther than
merely criticizing the Court's performance in searching for the remedies
"typically available in equity." He says that "the concept of 'typically
equitable' has no ascertainable meaning." 2 8 9 If taken as a general point

about equitable remedies, however, this statement is incorrect. 290 Even
though there will be boundary questions, there are remedies that were
"typically available in equity." These include, as Langbein himself
notes, the injunction and the constructive trust. 29 1 And there are some
remedies that were not typically available in equity, such as
mandamus. Indeed, this very fact-i.e., that some remedies were
typically available in equity and other remedies were not-is what gives
bite to Langbein's critique of the Court's misclassification.
The Court is right to look to the history of equity. It is forced to
do as much by the Seventh Amendment and the statutes authorizing

&

284. Conversely, there have long been monetary remedies in equity. For example, on the logic
of equitable "damages in lieu of injunctions," see Gardner, supranote 266, at 53-54 n.36.
285. See, e.g., Elgin v. Dep't of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2131 (2012) ("Petitioners sought
equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment . . . ."); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 299
(1995) ("[H]abeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy . . . ."); see also 1 RANDY HERTZ
JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.2, pp. 14-15 (6th ed.
2011) (collecting habeas cases). On the classification of the declaratory judgment, see Bray, supra
note 120. On the classification of habeas, see Smith, supra note 282, at 43 ("By the time of Charles
II applications for habeas corpus ... were usually made to the Court of King's Bench rather than
to the Chancery . . . .").
286. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 1351-54; Thomas, supra note 14, at 1074.
287. 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1976 (2014).
288. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
289. Langbein, supra note 8, at 1353.
290. Langbein's critique can also be read more narrowly-as only about the limitations of the
"typically equitable" concept for federal trust law, or as only about the construction the Court gave
to "typically equitable" in Knudson. In those narrower forms, the critique would not be vulnerable
to the objections made here.
291. Langbein, supra note 8, at 1357 (noting equitable origin of the constructive trust). Other
traditional equitable remedies include specific performance, equitable rescission, equitable lien,
and accounting for profits. See Getzler, supra note 30, at 186.
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equitable relief.2 92 That is why even the dissenters in the two closely
divided early cases, Grupo Mexicano and Knudson, responded with
their own appeals to the history of equity 2 9 3 -it

takes a history to beat

a history. The Court is also right, when it looks to the history of equity,
to avoid the extremes that were offered in Grupo Mexicano-Justice
Scalia's seeming insistence on remedies that were available in 1789,294
and Justice Ginsburg's apparent reduction of equity to amorphous
principles such as "flexibility" and "adaptability." 295 The middle course
the Court has taken by constructing an artificial history of equity is a
better way, for it is a faithful reading of the relevant statutes and is
more consistent with the long tradition of equity.
The historical criticism of the Court's new equity cases is
therefore narrowly right and broadly wrong. It is right about the equity
malapropisms. Yet these are actual mistakes-the Court is making
statements about equity that are wrong, statements that learned
scholars such as Langbein and Laycock can show are wrong. Indeed,
perhaps in response to the criticism, 296 the Court has subsequently
worked more carefully; most of the errors appeared in the earliest new
equity cases. 297 The task the Court has given itself is a hard one, not an
impossible or incoherent one.2 9 8

292. For recognition of this point even by critics of the distinction between legal and equitable
remedies, see supranote 4. Nor are these requirements merely vestigial. Congress routinely passes
statutes invoking equity, see supra note 76, and a recent state merger of law and equity courts was
accomplished by a constitutional amendment that expressly "preserve[d] the right of trial by jury
as declared in this Constitution," ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX, § 3.
293. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 228-34 (2002) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting); Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 33537 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
294. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part III.A.
296. It seems clear that the Justices have been reading, though not citing, Langbein's
criticisms. Compare Langbein, supra note 8, at 1352-53 (discussing surcharge), with CIGNA Corp.
v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1880-81, 1885 (2011) (same).
297. E.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Knudson, 534 U.S. 204;
Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. 308. On a more recent misstatement, however, see supra note 250
(discussing Petrella).
298. See Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative Constitutional
Adjudication in Federal Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 689 (2009) (noting that in constitutional
cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century "the federal courts applied the traditional
rules of equity without difficulty: So long as the court had jurisdiction, the litigant demonstrated
a risk of irreparable injury, and there was no adequate remedy available to him at law, the courts
were able to fashion an appropriate equitable remedy"); Susan Harthill, The Supreme Court Fills
a Gaping Hole: CIGNA Corp. v. Amara Clarifies the Scope of Equitable Relief Under ERISA, 45
JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 767 (2012) (largely approving of Amara); Roberts, supra note 4, at 1039
n.69 (noting that even though "errors abound," still "there are numerous court opinions that
correctly distinguish legal restitution from equitable restitution," and citing Sereboff with
approval).
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B. The Representation of Doctrine
Also narrowly right and broadly wrong is the second line of
criticism. Remedies scholars have reacted with surprise and dismay to
the eBay test for permanent injunctions. 299 The dismay is
understandable, for the test reflects a deeply contrary view of the value
of distinguishing legal and equitable remedies. (More on that
momentarily.) But the surprise is somewhat overdone. There may not
have been a single federal case that had previously applied the exact
eBay test. But every part of the eBay test was familiar. 300 Some state
courts had used very similar tests.301 And when federal courts had used
tests for permanent injunctions before eBay, they tended to be various
combinations of five different elements: the four parts of the eBay test
plus actual success on the merits. 302
Two other doctrinal criticisms are often made. One is that the
Court improperly treated the irreparable injury and the "no adequate
remedy at law" requirement as two different things, instead of
recognizing that they are the same thing. 30 3 Here, the critics of the
Court have the better of the argument. For permanent injunctions,
these formulations are customarily interchangeable. It is true that
some scholars have drawn distinctions between the irreparable injury
rule and the adequacy requirement, but those distinctions do not justify
treating these as two independent requirements for a plaintiff seeking
an equitable remedy. 304 Yet even here what the Court did was not

299. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text. Furthermore, for a test for a permanent
injunction, success on the merits is a pointless inquiry, since it is obvious that one can be given
only after the defendant has been found to have violated the law. It is a long time since an
injunction could be given to constrain sheer cussedness.
303. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. There is even authority for including the
public interest in the balancing of the equities, a position that would suggest parts three and four
of the eBay test are really a single inquiry. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 132, at 387-90; cf. United
States v. City of New York, No. 07-cv-2067 (NGG) (RLM), 2010 WL 4137536, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
19, 2010) (concluding, in a Title VII case, that because the plaintiff United States and defendant
New York City were both "governmental entities, the analysis of the balance of hardships greatly
overlaps with the question of whether an injunction would serve the public interest").
304. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. If, as Gene Shreve has suggested, there are
cases in which one formulation or the other is more felicitous, see Shreve, supra note 162, at 39293, then it hardly makes sense to use both. Nor does it make sense to require both if irreparable
injury is one way (but only one way) to show there is no adequate remedy at law. See SCHOENBROD
ET AL., supra note 162, at 81-82. Perhaps two independent requirements could be supported by
David Shapiro's suggestion that the lack of an adequate remedy at law was jurisdictional while
irreparable injury was a consideration for the court to weigh in deciding whether to act. See
Shapiro, supra note 162, at 548-49. But the eBay test does not make this distinction; irreparable
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original, for before eBay there were injunction tests that had presented
the irreparable injury rule and the adequacy requirement as separate
requirements. 30 5
In addition, the concern that the Court's decision in eBay might
obliterate a number of equitable principles is somewhat overdrawn. The
scholars who raise this concern, especially Mark Gergen, John Golden,
and Henry Smith, 306 are right that the Court has been too resistant to
equitable principles that take the form of presumptions. They are also
right in pointing out that the Court has been silent about the traditional
structure of some of the concepts it refers to, especially the "balance of
hardships" 307-and that such silence could be misinterpreted by the
lower courts as eliminating the carefully developed structure of the
traditional doctrine. 308 And they are right to criticize the Court for
selecting one equitable defense, which is relevant in only some cases,
and presenting it as something the plaintiff must negate in every case
in which an injunction is sought. Even so, there is no reason to think
that all of the principles for equitable decisionmaking must be gathered

injury and the lack of an adequate remedy at law are both presented as considerations that go to
whether it is necessary and proper for the court to issue an injunction.
305. See Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1128 (11th Cir. 2005); Tesmer
v. Granholm, 333 F.3d 683, 702 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S.
368, 381-82 (1949) (treating irreparable injury as a separate question from the lack of an adequate
remedy at law); Ind. Mfg. Co. v. Koehne, 188 U.S. 681, 684 (1903) ("[1]t must appear that the party
has no adequate remedy by the ordinary processes of the law, or that the case falls under some
other recognized head of equity jurisdiction, such as multiplicity of suits, irreparable injury, etc.");
Gentala v. City of Tucson, 213 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000) ("To obtain a permanent injunction,
the moving party must demonstrate the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury
and the inadequacy of remedies at law." (internal quotation marks omitted)); N.Y. State Nat'l Org.
for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1362 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Generally, to obtain a permanent
injunction a party must show the absence of an adequate remedy at law and irreparable harm if
the relief is not granted."); Opat v. Ludeking, 666. N.W.2d 597, 603 (Iowa 2003) ("An injunction is
warranted when necessary to prevent irreparable injury and when the plaintiff has no adequate
remedy at law."); 67A N.Y. JUR. 2D INJUNCTIONS § 167 (listing four requirements for a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction under New York law, including "(2) that the plaintiff has no
adequate remedy at law; [and] (3) that serious and irreparable injury will result if the injunction
is not granted"); sources cited supra notes 154-55; cf. COTTER, supra note 139, at 102-03
(concluding that the first two elements of the eBay test are redundant, yet adding-'though to be
fair, some courts' listings of preliminary injunction factors reflect the same redundancy").
306. See Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 10, at 205-06.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 166-70.
308. On that structure, see generally Laycock, supra note 166. The state of the doctrine in the
federal courts after eBay needs more investigation, and it is possible that the silence of eBay on
what the "balance of hardships" means has created confusion. But the lower courts do not appear
to have shifted en masse to a fault-free cost-benefit analysis. See FenF, L.L.C. v. SmartThingz,
Inc., 12-CV-14770, 2014 WL 1431692, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2014); Sealant Sys. Int'l, Inc. v.
TEK Global S.R.L., 5:11-CV-00774-PSG, 2014 WL 1008183, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2014).
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from the four corners of eBay. 309 The decision itself does not say as
much. And whatever the Court may have meant in eBay, the Court has
subsequently demonstrated that the eBay list should not be read as
exclusive. For example, in Petrella, the latest of the new equity
decisions, the Court reaffirmed the vitality of an equitable doctrinethe laches defense-that eBay never mentioned. 3 10 And in Petrella the
Court was more circumspect, for it specifically noted that the equitable
considerations it was listing were not exhaustive. 311
As with the criticisms of the Court's artificial history, the
criticisms of the doctrine have merit but can be overstated. Apart from
the obvious error of labeling eBay's test the traditional one, the doctrinal
conclusions the Court has drawn are generally conventional, and each
one is at least a well-represented minority position in contemporary
equity case law.
C. The Need for Justification
The third criticism is more telling. It is the lack of justification
from the Court for retaining the distinction between legal and equitable
remedies in contemporary American law. 3 12 At every step, the Court has
appealed to history and tradition as sufficient authority. In eBay, for
example, Chief Justice Roberts invoked for equitable remedies the

309. See EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 842 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006), for the general proposition that a "court
exercises [its] remedial discretion in accordance with traditional principles of equity, unless [a]
statute directs otherwise").
310. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014). Similarly, in Kansas
v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1059 (2015), the Court said that a plaintiff seeking an injunction
must show a "cognizable danger of recurrent violation" (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co.,
345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). See id. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority on
this point). Yet this equitable requirement was also not mentioned in eBay.
311. See Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1979 (recognizing that on remand the district court should
consider not only the points listed by the Court but also "any other considerations that would
justify adjusting injunctive relief or profits"); cf. Brief of Douglas Laycock, Mark P. Gergen & Doug
Rendleman as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Side at 26-27, Petrella v. Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc. (No. 12-1315) (urging the Court not to treat eBay as exhaustively stating equitable
principles).
312. Laycock's critique of the law-and-equity distinction remains, and the Supreme Court has
not attempted to rebut it. For continued scholarly support for it after eBay, see Laycock, supra
note 166, at 23 n.107 ("[eBay and Monsanto] say that district courts must find irreparable injury,
but remarkably, they say nothing about what makes an injury irreparable."); Rendleman, supra
note 4, at 97 (criticizing "the nonfunctional terminology of separate legal and equitable
discretion"); Roberts, supra note 4, at 1033 (endorsing Laycock's call to "complete the assimilation
of equity").
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Holmesian aphorism that "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic." 3 13 Surely, though, it is better not to have to choose.

The critics of the line between legal and equitable remedies, and
of the idea of equitable exceptionalism, have never complained that
those notions lack a historical pedigree. Instead, the critics have argued
that those notions are merely rhetorical and serve no function in
contemporary law. In Daniel Farber's words, they are "vague
generalities about the history of equitable discretion, which courts are
fond of reciting." 314
To rebut those criticisms and give a justification for its new
equity cases, the Court needs to show the value of equity's past for the
present. There are possible starting points. In a growing body of work,
Henry Smith has explored the problem of opportunism, and especially
the misuse of legal powers and rights in ways that are hard to predict
and prohibit in advance. 315 The solution he explores is "functional
equity." Although Smith does not limit that term to the doctrines that
are associated with the Court of Chancery, he nevertheless insists that
there is significant overlap between historical and functional equity.3 16
Many traditional equitable doctrines are useful checks on opportunism.
For example, the "equitable maxims, defences, and remedial
doctrines . . . serve to bolster formal law in the face of misuse by

opportunists." 317 One way, then, that the Court could justify preserving
equitable doctrines is their well-developed capacity for mitigating
opportunism.
Another possible justification lies in the interlocking
relationship of the rules that remain distinctively equitable in
American law. 3 18 These categories of equitable rules work together and
have a certain logic. First, a legal system needs remedies that order
someone to do or not do something. In the United States, those are by
and large equitable remedies, such as injunctions, specific performance,
and accounting for profits. Second, in order to be effective, those
remedies will need to be supported by managerial devices. In the United
313. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)).
314. Farber, supra note 259, at 545.
315. See Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, supranote 49; Smith, Property,Equity, and
the Rule of Law, supra note 49.
316. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, supra note 49, at 262-63 ("The equitable style
of decision-making could be found on both sides of the old law versus equity divide, but, because
of its unique role, equity in the Anglo-American tradition did often, and characteristically, reflect
the equitable style of decision-making.").
317. Smith, Property, Equity, and the Rule of Law, supra note 49, at 226.
318. On the argument sketched in this paragraph, see Bray, supra note 49, at 4-8, and see
generally Bray, supra note 120.
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States those, too, are largely equitable-managerial devices such as
contempt, modification and dissolution, and equitable helpers (such as
masters and receivers).1 9 Third, to mitigate the costs of those remedies
and managerial devices, and the risk that they will be abused, there
will need to be constraints. Here, too, there are many distinctively
equitable doctrines that function as constraints on equitable remedies,
including equitable defenses such as laches. These three categories
work together as a system, and taking apart that system piecemeal
could undermine a set of complements and compromises that
simultaneously empower equity while limiting its misuse. In the new
equity cases, by insisting on traditional boundaries and content for
equitable remedies, the Court has-wittingly or unwittinglypreserved that system of equitable remedies.
Of course there are also lucid criticisms of the distinction
between legal and equitable remedies. There has been a long line of
what might be called "great anti-equity lawyers" 320-a list that includes
William Blackstone, Frederic Maitland, and Peter Birks in England
and Zechariah Chafee and Douglas Laycock in America. These critics
have argued that equity is not distinctive. Much as Karl Llewellyn
famously did with canons of statutory construction, 32 1 they have found
a legal parallel for each of equity's reportedly exceptional features. 322 In
the nineteenth century, the Field Codes and the English Judicature
Acts fused equity and law in many respects, and ever since the critics
have argued against any hint of equitable revanchism. 323 Their
arguments deserve a fuller scholarly response than is possible here.
And their arguments deserve some notice by the Court as it continues
to chart a contrary course.

319. See Bray, supranote 21, at 1123-33 & n.168.
320. The phrase is borrowed from Joshua Getzler, who said "Maitland was not a 'great equity
lawyer', as we are often told, but perhaps the most sophisticated of the great anti-equity lawyers."
Getzler, supra note 30, at 166, Beyond Maitland's scholarly writings, there is his withering
assessment of Chancery in an article for the Encyclopedia Brittanica: "A court which started with
the idea of doing summary justice for the poor became a court which did a highly refined, but tardy
justice, suitable only to the rich." Frederic William Maitland, English Law, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA 563 (1950), reprinted in FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND READER 125, 129 (V.T.H.

Delany ed. 1957).
321. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (1950).
322. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *429-42 (insisting that the only
difference between law and equity was "in the forms and mode of their proceedings," since both
courts of equity and courts of law "determine[] according to the spirit of the rule, and not according
to the strictness of the letter").
323. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 4, at 53-54.
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VI. CONCLUSION

It has been said that "science advances funeral by funeral." 324
But sometimes an expected funeral does not happen. Sometimes the
planned and widely agreed upon advance is never made. The expected
demise of the line between legal and equitable remedies has not
occurred. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court's new equity cases have
preserved that line and the doctrines that constitute it, such as the rule
that courts will give equitable relief only if legal relief would be
inadequate.
Taken as a whole, the new equity cases are largely evolutionary.
The Court has been confronted with statutes authorizing "equitable
relief," and it has had to give that term meaning. It is hard to look to
the future of equity; instead the Court has looked to the present and
past. The Court has pronounced somewhat novel tests for permanent
and preliminary injunctions, yet each part of those tests is traditional
in equity. Many themes in the new equity cases were in fact present in
its earlier cases, such as the idea that the injunction is an exceptional
remedy. 325
Nevertheless, there have been several significant departures,
even from the Court's earlier cases, in the new equity decisions. One is
the explicit attention to methodology, and the elaboration of a set of
canonical or presumptive sources for defining what was done "in
equity." Another is the pervasive appeal to history and tradition. Yet
another departure is the Justices' willingness to agree on this
approach-unlike in the Court's earliest cases in the new equity
jurisprudence and unlike some other bodies of case law where the Court
has looked to history and tradition.
But the most significant departure in the new equity cases, and
what makes them revolutionary, is not a disjuncture from the Court's
earlier cases. It is the fact that the Court is acting directly contrary to
the conventional wisdom in remedies scholarship over the last four
decades. In these cases, the Court has preserved the line between legal
and equitable remedies, entrenched the irreparable injury rule, and
stressed the exceptionalism of injunctions. These changes are already

324. That quotation is often attributed to Max Planck, though it is a paraphrase: "A new
scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but
rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with
it." MAX PLANCK, A Scientific Autobiography, in SCIENTIFIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER PAPERS

33-34 (Frank Gaynor trans., 1949).
325. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982).
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influencing how the federal courts give injunctions,326 and they may
shape the law of remedies for decades to come.
Yet it is worth reflecting on the Court's frequent invocations of
the tradition of equity. What do those invocations really suggest about
the vitality of that tradition in the United States? One might look at the
spectrum of the opinion writers in these cases and draw the conclusion
that the tradition of equity must be hale and hearty. On the other hand,
the very need to invoke a tradition can be a sign that it is losing its
force. 327 No one knows for sure which one is true here. For now, though,
it seems that the chancellor rides again. And if the chancellor is back in
the saddle, then his foot is back in the stirrup.

326. This is true whether one thinks of eBay as a "legal juggernaut" that has radically
redrawn the law of the injunction in the federal courts, Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 10, at
206; or, less disruptively, as a way the Supreme Court has focused the doctrinal analysis of the
lower federal courts and pushed them toward a "more thorough consideration" of the
circumstances in which the injunction is given, Janutis, supra note 153, at 604-07.
327. See Eric Hobsbawm, Introductionto THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1, 8 (Eric Hobsbawm
& Terence Ranger eds., 1983) ("where the old ways are alive, traditions need be neither revived
nor invented.").

